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ABSTRACT
The dissertation explores determinants and consequences of international diversification
and consists of two essays. Essay I focuses on the relationship between international
diversification and firm performance (ID-P). Drawing on the global strategy literature
and the institution-based view of strategy, we propose that the mixed findings of extant
research on the ID-P relationship can be explained by the contextual conditions in which
this relationship exists, including home-country formal and informal institutions. The
model is tested in a meta-analysis (HOMA, MARA, and HiLLMA analyses) of firm-,
industry-, and home country-level factors driving the ID-P relationship. The sample
consists of 359 primary studies across 32 countries between 1972 and 2012—the largest
sample of primary studies of any meta-analysis on this topic to date. The main finding is
that international diversification positively impacts firm performance and the strength of
this effect is contingent on the specific formal and informal institutions of the home
country. Essay II focuses on the relationship between corporate governance and
international diversification (CG-ID). The study utilizes a multidimensional
conceptualization of the two constructs, exploring breadth and depth of ID and several
mechanisms of CG (e.g., ownership concentration, CEO compensation, and board
independence). Drawing on agency theory and the resource and information-processing
perspectives, we propose bidirectional causal effects between CG and ID. Our arguments
are then contextualized by exploring the moderating effect of home-country institutional
and cultural conditions and, in particular, the legal protection of minority shareholders
iv

and the national uncertainty avoidance. We test the model using meta-analytic structural
equation modeling (MASEM) with data from 104 primary studies across 28 countries
covering the 1970-2012 period and find overall support for our theoretical predictions.
The dissertation contributes to the literatures of global strategy and corporate governance
and provides valuable insights to the practice of international business.
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INTRODUCTION
Business landscapes are increasingly global. Over the last quarter of a century, world FDI
outward stock has dramatically increased (from 2,254 billion of dollars in 1990 to 25,875
in 2014) and country investment policy measures around the world have been geared to
promote cross-border investment to an ever-larger extent. In this scenario, constantly
advancing our understanding of the implications of international diversification is a
paramount objective for both scholars and practitioners. Equally important is the
investigation of the factors potentially affecting cross-border investment decisions, given
the complex competitive and economic cost-benefit trade-off characterizing international
diversification. Indeed, the determinants and consequences of international diversification
have drawn significant attention in the strategy and international business literatures.
Research has investigated antecedents at the individual, group, firm, industry, and
country level of analysis, as well as outcomes at the firm and country level of analysis.
This dissertation extends the extant literature on the determinants and consequences of
international diversification with two empirical essays.
Essay I focuses on the relationship between international diversification and firm
performance (ID-P). Understanding the performance consequences of international
diversification is widely recognized as a seminal issue in strategic management, given the
increasingly global nature of firms’ strategic focus and actions. Over the past four
decades, numerous empirical studies in management and international business have
examined the performance implications of international diversification and found
1

positive, negative and non-significant linear effects as well as a variety of curvilinear
relations. This inconclusive empirical evidence suggests that far from having reached a
mature understanding of the ID-P relationship, the field is yet to fully understand this
complex phenomenon.
Drawing on the global strategy literature and the institution-based view of
strategy, we propose that the mixed findings of extant research on the ID-P relationship
can be explained by the contextual conditions in which this relationship exists, including
home-country formal and informal institutions. The model is tested in a meta-analysis
(HOMA, MARA, and HiLLMA analyses) of firm-, industry-, and home country-level
factors driving the ID-P relationship. The sample consists of 359 primary studies across
32 countries between 1972 and 2012—the largest sample of primary studies of any metaanalysis on this topic to date. The main finding is that international diversification
positively impacts firm performance, although the overall effect is small and its
magnitude is contingent on the specific formal and informal institutions of the home
country.
We make three main contributions to the global strategy literatures. First, we
develop a novel integration of the theoretical perspectives from the ID-P research and the
institution-based view of strategy to explain how embeddedness in home-country
institutions affects the strength of the ID-P relationship. Second, we show the importance
of including both formal and informal institutions in analyses of firms’ institutional
embeddedness, thereby extending our knowledge of the effects of institutional
complexity. Our third contribution is methodological and reflects our use of advanced
meta-analytical techniques based on both product-moment and partial correlations as
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effect sizes, which allow us to address unresolved debates about the sign and shape of the
ID-P relationship.
Essay II focuses on the relationship between corporate governance and
international diversification (CG-ID). From a theoretical point of view, corporate
governance scholars suggest that governance mechanisms may affect the extent of
international diversification. By contrast, the international management literature
suggests that expansion abroad, through multiple theoretical mechanisms, may trigger
changes in firms’ corporate governance framework. The literature, indeed, provides
evidence for both causality directions. For example, research corroborates the argument
that firms’ degree of international diversification both affects and is affected by the level
of contingent executive pay. Similarly, some scholars show that the extent of foreign
expansion has an effect on the proportion of outside directors, while others provide
evidence that board independence impacts export propensity. Likewise, the literature, on
the one hand, shows that board size influences the firm’s degree of international
diversification and, on the other hand, provides empirical support for the opposite
causality direction―from firms’ degree of foreign expansion to board size. Besides the
direction of causality, the sign of the relationship between corporate governance and
international diversification also receives mixed empirical evidence. Some scholars report
a positive correlation between the level of ownership concentration and the extent of
international diversification, while others provide evidence for a negative correlation.
Similarly, research shows both a positive and a negative correlation between CEO duality
and the degree of foreign expansion.
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Extant research therefore, from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective,
does not provide definitive answer as to the nature (i.e., direction, magnitude, and sign)
of the CG-ID relationship. Moreover, extant research is somewhat lacking in the
exploration of the theoretical mechanisms linking corporate governance and international
diversification. In order to have a more impactful research on the CG-ID relationship, it is
critical to develop a more fine-grained understanding of which mechanisms are at play
and how they operate.
Hence, there is an opportunity for further research, which may push forward the
existing theoretical knowledge about the relationship between corporate governance and
international diversification. This dissertation utilizes a multidimensional
conceptualization of the two constructs, exploring breadth and depth of ID and several
mechanisms of CG (e.g., ownership concentration, CEO compensation, and board
independence). Drawing on agency theory and the resource and information-processing
perspectives, we shed new light on such relationship in three major ways. First, we
investigate each direction of causality and the theoretical mechanisms at play. Second, we
examine the relative explanatory power of the two alternative cause-effect linkages
between corporate governance and international diversification. Third, we contextualize
our analysis by exploring the moderating effect of institutional and cultural conditions in
the home country including the legal protection of minority shareholders and the national
uncertainty avoidance.
We test the model using meta-analytic structural equation modeling (MASEM)
with data from 104 primary studies across 28 countries covering the 1970-2012 period
and four main findings emerge. First, the causal relationship between corporate
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governance and international diversification is bidirectional and multifaceted in nature.
Second, corporate governance explains the degree of international diversification better
than international diversification explains the activation of corporate governance
mechanisms. Third, the nature of the causal linkages between corporate governance and
international diversification changes depending on whether the focus is on the depth or
breadth of foreign expansion. Fourth, both directions of causality in the CG-ID
relationship are moderated by country-level contingencies including legal shareholder
protection and uncertainty avoidance.
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ESSAY 1

HOME COUNTRY INSTITUTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATIONPERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP: A META-ANALYTIC REVIEW

INTRODUCTION
Understanding the performance consequences of internationalization is widely
recognized as a seminal issue in strategic management (e.g., Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, &
Connelly, 2006b; Kirca et al., 2011; Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994), given the
increasingly global nature of firms’ strategic focus and actions (Hill & Hult, 2015; Hitt et
al., 2006b).1 Over the past four decades, numerous empirical studies in management and
international business (IB) have examined the performance effects of internationalization
and found positive, negative and non-significant linear effects as well as a variety of
curvilinear relations (see Hitt et al., 2006b). This inconclusive empirical evidence
suggests that far from having reached a mature understanding of the internationalizationperformance (I-P) relationship, the field is yet to “fully grasp this complex phenomenon”
(Wiersema & Bowen, 2011: 154; see also: Cardinal, Miller, & Palich, 2011; Hennart,
2011). We argue that the empirical inconsistencies in the existing research on the I-P
1
We rely on Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson’s (2007: 251) definition of internationalization as “a strategy
through which a firm expands the sales of its goods or services across the borders of global regions and
countries into different geographic locations or markets”. Terms such as “internationalization”,
“international diversification”, “geographic diversification”, “international expansion”, “globalization”,
“multinationality” and “degree of internationalization” are often used to refer to the same phenomenon
(Hitt et al., 2006b; Kirca et al., 2011); thus, we use them interchangeably.
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relationship stem primarily from its failure to adequately consider the moderating effects
of firms’ home country formal and informal institutions.
The limited attention paid to the role of home country formal and informal
institutions on the I-P relationship is surprising, given that IB research has firmly
established the importance of home country institutions for firms’ global strategy (e.g.,
Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008) – also referred to as the “country of origin” effect (COE)
(e.g., Elango & Sethi, 2007; Harzing & Sorge, 2003; Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2003).
Still, there has been little effort to determine which home country institutions influence
the I-P relationship, or the mechanisms underlying these effects (Pajunen, 2008: 653).
Most empirical works on the I-P relationship, including existing meta-analyses (e.g.,
Kirca, Roth, Hult, & Cavusgil, 2012a), have either taken home country institutions as a
given, examined only institutional distances between home and host country, or relied on
a narrow conceptualization of the home country institutional context by using dummy
variables or focusing on a single institutional characteristic (e.g., Geringer et al., 1989; Li
& Yue, 2008). One important exception is Wan and Hoskisson’s (2003) study, which
develops a multifaceted conceptualization of the home country institutional context and
its moderating effect on the I-P relationship. Further, very few studies have examined
how multiple home country institutions shape the I-P relationship across a large number
of countries and years (Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013). Thus, existing findings
may not generalize to sets of “different institutions and to a broader spectrum of
countries” (Holmes et al., 2013: 533).
This study addresses these limitations both theoretically and empirically.
Theoretically, we draw on the institution-based view and COE traditions in strategic
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management to explain how home country formal and informal institutions shape the I-P
relationship (e.g., Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, Van Essen, & Van Oosterhout, 2011;
Elango & Sethi, 2007; Harzing & Sorge, 2003; Peng et al., 2008; Van Essen, Heugens,
Otten, & Van Oosterhout, 2012; Wan & Hoskisson 2003). Specifically, we view home
country contexts as complex, multifaceted institutional environments that provide the
foundational social structures, and thereby create templates for organizational action
(North, 1990). Home country institutions are the central components of national business,
governance and innovation systems (Henisz & Williamson, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993; Whitley, 1992).
Therefore, they play a critical role in firms’ ability to develop and maintain their
competitive advantage at home and abroad by shaping managerial cognition and by
enabling or constraining the acquisition and deployment of strategic resources and
capabilities (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011).
Empirically, we use advanced meta-analytic techniques (e.g., Carney et al., 2011;
Van Essen, Otten, & Carberry, 2015) to combine numerous single-country studies into a
single multi-country study, thereby maximizing the number and diversity of the home
country contexts under examination to test our hypotheses about the effects of home
country institutions on the I-P relationship. Specifically, our meta-analytic tests combine
359 studies from across the management, economics and finance disciplines – a
significant improvement from existing meta-analyses on the I-P relationship (i.e., Bausch
& Krist, 2007; Kirca et al., 2011; Kirca et al., 2012a; Ruigrok & Wagner, 2004; Yang &
Driffield, 2012), which respectively included 36, 111, 141, 62 and 54 studies.
Furthermore, our study covers the years from 1972 to 2012 and a larger number of firm-
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year observations (1,558,455 firm observations for the bivariate analyses and 2,576,772
firm-year observations for the partial analyses) and countries (i.e., 32) than any previous
meta-analysis on this topic.
Our results show that internationalization has an overall positive, but small, effect
on performance, albeit with substantial variation in the effect size distribution depending
on firms’ countries of origin. Firms in some countries experience significant negative
performance effects from their internationalization efforts (e.g., in Mexico), while in
others internationalization generates significant positive effects that range from very
small (e.g., in South Korea) to sizable (e.g., in Greece), or no effects (e.g., in the
Netherlands and Spain). Further, we find that specific home country institutions have
different effects on the I-P relationship. In particular, our results show that home country
quality of business regulations, political risk, generalized trust, long-term orientation and
uncertainty avoidance are all moderators of the I-P relationship.
This research makes three main contributions to the global strategy literature.
First, we show that, in the aggregate, the positive linear association between
internationalization and performance is modest, and should be considered only as a
“stylized fact” (Helfat, 2007). We also show that this relationship is contingent on home
country institutional conditions, which can significantly affect the magnitude and sign of
this relationship. Taken together, these results indicate that studies of the I-P relationship
should account for COE; if not, they are likely to be underspecified both theoretically and
empirically. Relatedly, our findings show the relevance of the institution-based view of
strategy for studying the I-P relationship. In particular, they suggest that home country
institutions influence firms’ transaction costs and their managers’ cognitive processes,
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which, in turn, affect their ability to acquire and deploy strategic resources (Kirca,
Jayachandran, & Bearden, 2005), and, ultimately, their potential to succeed in markets at
home and abroad. To date, research has largely overlooked the importance of the
institution-based view for contextualizing the I-P relationship. Second, we show that
multiple formal and informal institutions across many countries, over a long period of
time, affect firms’ ability to benefit from internationalization, contributing to research on
institutional complexity (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011).
In doing so, our study provides a richer assessment of how firms’ institutional
embeddedness in their home country affects their effectiveness in international markets.
Our third contribution is methodological and pertains to our meta-analytical tests’ use of
both Pearson product-moment correlation and partial correlation as effect sizes, which
represents a significant improvement from existing meta-analyses that only used Pearson
product-moment correlations. Incorporating partial correlations allows us to generate
conclusive findings on several important matters that could not be properly addressed by
previous meta-analyses, including the sign and shape of the I-P relationship (Stanley &
Doucouliagos, 2012).
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a review of the literature,
focusing on the mixed findings about the sign and shape of the I-P relationship and
previous attempts at reconciling them. We also identify firm-, industry- and host countrylevel variables that have been deemed important in existing tests of the I-P relationship.
Then, we develop our central arguments based on the institution-based view to explain
how the home country institutional context shapes the I-P relationship. We focus on the
role of home countries’ formal and informal institutions in enabling or constraining
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firms’ global competitive advantage. We also provide some specific examples of home
country formal and informal institutions that are relevant for the I-P relationship. Next,
we explain the meta-analytic methodology employed, data, and results. Finally, we
conclude with a discussion of our results and a number of avenues for future research on
the I-P relationship and the institution-based view in strategy. These suggestions point to
other scarcely researched factors that might also affect firms’ ability to generate profits
from their internationalization efforts, steps needed to further strengthen the
methodological rigor of the empirical research on the focal relationship, and ways in
which theoretical insights from the institution-based view can further advance research in
this area.
THE PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION
A considerable body of research has focused on the performance implications of
internationalization. Several review articles (Cardinal et al., 2011; Hennart, 2011; Hitt et
al., 2006b; Matysiak & Bausch, 2012; Oesterle & Richta, 2013) and meta-analyses
(Bausch & Krist, 2007; Kirca et al., 2011; Kirca, Hult, Deligonul, Perryy, & Cavusgil,
2012b; Yang & Driffield, 2012) have presented overviews of research on this topic, as
well as critical assessments of the main theoretical arguments used to explain the I-P
relationship (Hennart, 2007). Rather than providing another comprehensive review of the
vast literature on the I-P relationship, we focus instead on its central debates regarding
the sign and shape of the central relationship, the role of various methodological and
model specification artifacts that might explain the heterogeneous findings of this body of
research, and recent attempts at reconciling these mixed findings.
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Conflicting and Inconclusive Empirical Results
Scholars acknowledge that internationalization is accompanied by inherent benefits
(Geringer et al., 1989) as well as costs (Tallman & Li, 1996), which can produce different
views about the performance effects of internationalization (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim,
1997; Lu & Beamish, 2004). The positive effects are explained by economies of scale
and scope, location-based advantages, international arbitrage, broader learning and
market opportunities (Cardinal et al., 2011; Hennart, 2011; Hitt et al., 2006b). Costs
result from the complexity of internationalization dynamics due to external (e.g.,
managing across more diverse countries, liabilities of foreignness) and internal (e.g.,
coordinating more foreign direct investments) factors (Hennart, 2011). Empirical results
have been largely inconclusive on the existence and shape of the I-P relationship,
providing support for positive linear relationships (e.g., Grant, Jamine, & Thomas, 1988;
Kim, Hwang & Burgers, 1989), negative linear relationships (Siddharthan & Lall, 1982;
Wan & Hoskisson, 2003), no relationships (Hennart, 2007, 2011), U-shaped relationships
(Lu & Beamish, 2001), inverted U-shaped relationships (Geringer et al., 1989; Gomes &
Ramaswamy, 1999; Hitt et al., 1997), and sigmoid relationships (Contractor, Kundu, &
Hsu, 2003; Lu & Beamish, 2004).
Advocates of the positive linear relationship focus on the benefits of
internationalization. This approach has been criticized because it often ignores the
fundamental complexity of internationalization (Cardinal et al., 2011). More complex
non-linear relationships have been proposed to reflect both the costs and benefits of
internationalization. Proponents of a U-shaped I-P relationship (e.g., Lu & Beamish,
2001) argue that firm performance is likely to decline in the early phases of
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internationalization due to the costs stemming from the liabilities of foreignness and
newness (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). However, over time as the firm continues to
internationalize, it acquires sufficient knowledge and capabilities to overcome these
difficulties and capture the benefits associated with internationalization. Thus, its
performance improves over time. Proponents of the inverted U-shaped relationship (e.g.,
Geringer et al., 1989; Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999), instead, emphasize the positive
effects of internationalization up to an “internationalization threshold”, where the costs of
coordination among diverse subsidiaries exceed the benefits. Thus, according to this
view, firms are expected to enjoy better performance at moderate levels of
internationalization, but experience poorer performance at low and high levels of
internationalization. Finally, other researchers (e.g., Contractor et al., 2003; Lu &
Beamish, 2004; Thomas & Eden, 2004) propose a sigmoid I-P relationship in an effort to
synthesize the arguments made by the proponents of both the U-shaped and inverted Ushaped relationships. Similarly to the advocates of the U-shaped relationship, they
suggest that firm performance is likely to deteriorate in the early phases of
internationalization, but then improve at later stages. However, negative performance
effects are also likely to develop when the firms internationalize beyond a certain
threshold, as suggested by the proponents of the inverted U-shaped relationship. Sigmoid
models are thus described as more sophisticated and integrative by their authors because
they account for the impact of internationalization on performance at different levels of
internationalization.
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Reconciling Conflicting and Inconclusive Results
Conflicting findings about the sign and shape of the I-P relationship have triggered
several attempts to explain them. They can be broadly summarized in two groups. The
first group includes studies examining the impact of various methodological approaches
on the I-P relationship (see Bowen, 2007), such as differences in the time frames
examined, endogeneity controls, and operationalizations of the main variables of interest.
For example, Thomas and Eden (2004) show the different effects of internationalization
on short-term accounting measures of performance (e.g., return on assets, return on
equity, and return on sales) and long-term market-based measures (e.g., excess market
value, average market value). They find a stronger S-shaped effect in studies that rely on
market-based measures of performance. However, conflicting results can also be found in
studies relying purely on market-based measures (Hitt et al., 2006b). Another
methodological concern stems from the numerous approaches to measuring
internationalization as they capture different aspects of this phenomenon (Hennart, 2011;
Thomas & Eden, 2004). For example, while many studies measure firm’s
internationalization in terms of its “scale” (or “depth” – e.g., ratio of foreign sales to total
sales, foreign assets to total assets, or foreign employees to total employees), others rely
on measures that reflect “scope” (or “breadth” – e.g., number of countries, international
asset dispersion). These measures consider two different facets of firms’
internationalization. Scale reflects the strategic importance that a firm assigns to serving
foreign markets (Stopford & Wells, 1972); however, scope captures the heterogeneity of
internationalization across countries (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Tallman & Li, 1996).
Scope of internationalization can also help to explain the different non-linear
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relationships between internationalization and performance as it captures the potential
costs of internationalization. Firms with institutionally diverse portfolios of foreign
operations (i.e., with a larger scope of internationalization) are likely to experience
substantial complexity in their operations, given the need to manage operations across
countries with dissimilar institutional profiles (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Zahra, Ireland,
& Hitt, 2000). A larger scope of internationalization can also complicate the exploitation
of firm-specific assets (Rugman & Verbeke, 2005), thus negatively affecting
performance. To include both aspects of internationalization, some studies have
developed multidimensional measures of internationalization (e.g., Hitt, Bierman,
Uhlenbruck, & Shimizu, 2006a; Sullivan, 1994).
A second group of studies attempts to reconcile the conflicting findings of the I-P
literature by focusing on potential theory-driven moderators of the relationship (e.g.,
Bausch & Krist, 2007; Bowen, 2007; Hitt et al., 2006b). In addition to industry-level
moderating effects (e.g., Tallman & Li, 1996), a number of firm-level moderators have
been examined in the literature. Some of the most common ones include the degree of
product diversification (Hitt et al., 1997), size (Dragun, 2002), ownership type (Allen &
Pantzalis, 1996), leverage (Reuer & Miller, 1997), risk (Hejazi & Santor, 2010), growth
(Allen & Pantzalis, 1996), firm-specific intangible assets such as marketing and R&D
assets (Kirca et al., 2011), advertising intensity (Kim & Lyn, 1986), CEO pay or
international experience (Carpenter & Sanders, 2004), top management team’s (TMT’s)
international experience or diversity (Thomas, 2005), and human capital in the case of
service industries (Hitt et al., 2006a). However, the empirical results of some of these
moderating effects are not always consistent.
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Researchers have also examined how differences in firms’ internationalization
processes, in terms of pace (i.e., the speed with which it is carried out) and rhythm (i.e.,
the irregularity of the internationalization process) influence performance. For example,
using a sample of Dutch firms, Vermeulen and Barkema (2002) show that faster and
more irregular internationalization processes negatively moderate the I-P relationship.
However, Chang and Rhee (2011), using Korean data, find an insignificant relationship
between internationalization rhythm and performance. They also show that greater speed
enhances performance only in industries in which globalization pressures are high, and
when they are carried out by firms with superior international resources and capabilities.2
It is important to note that research on the performance implications of heterogeneous
processes of internationalization is still limited when compared to other areas of inquiry
reviewed herein.
Other studies rely on the construct of institutional distance and its impact on the IP relationship (e.g., Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005). Institutional distance refers to the
“difference/similarity between the regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutional
environments of the home and host countries” of a multinational enterprise (MNE)
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999: 68). Empirical studies have shown both positive and negative
moderating effects of institutional distance on the I-P relationship (e.g., Chao & Kumar,
2010; Tihanyi et al., 2005). For example, Tihanyi et al. (2005) find support for a positive
effect of cultural distance on performance, but only for MNEs entering developed
countries. Chao and Kumar (2010) also find that cultural distance is positively related to
MNE’s performance, however the effect for regulatory distance is negative. Some
researchers have also examined the overall quality of the institutional environment across
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all of the MNE’s portfolio of host countries, arguing that weaker institutional contexts are
more likely to increase the firm’s costs associated with “entry and liabilities of
foreignness and newness owing to unclear regulations and weak enforcement of the
rules” (Chao & Kumar, 2010: 95).
MODERATING ROLE OF HOME COUNTRY INSTITUTIONS
Attempts to reconcile mixed findings of the I-P relationship have examined a variety of
firm-, industry-, and host country-level factors, but scarce attention has been paid to the
role of firms’ home country institutional environments. This is surprising given the
existing view that home country institutions help shape firms’ strategies and their ability
to succeed at home and abroad by influencing their transaction costs and their managers’
cognitive processes. In particular, scholars have argued that home country institutions
engaging efficiency and uncertainty reduction mechanisms often determine the cost of
transacting internationally, and thereby affect firm performance. For example, CuervoCazurra (2011) argues that home country institutions affect firms’ domestic and global
performance because the “presence or absence of specific inputs outside the firm induces
it to develop distinct resources that either rely on the availability of particular external
inputs or compensate for the lack of certain external inputs […]” (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011:
383). In addition, “the particular norms and institutions prevailing in the country induce
the company to develop specific resources to be able to interact with other players in the
marketplace […]” (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011: 383). Others have explored country of origin
effects through the concept of national administrative heritage, which refers to shared
beliefs and cultural templates that determine "how things ought to be done" and
legitimize ways of organizing and controlling (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Elango & Sethi,
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2007; Lubatkin, Calori, Very, & Veiga, 1998; Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2003). The
concept of national administrative heritage builds on the rich and theoretically eclectic
body of work on the institutional embeddedness of firms’ behaviors (e.g., DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Guillén, 1994; Lubatkin et al., 1998). McGahan and Victer (2010) rely on
the related concept of employees’ imprinting reflecting their absorption of home countrybased cognitive frames.
An important exception to the limited empirical attention given to the moderating
role of home country institutions on the I-P relationship is Wan and Hoskisson’s study
(2003), which examines the political, legal and societal institutions of a firm’s home
country. The authors find that stronger formal and informal institutions positively
moderate the I-P relationship. Our study builds on Wan and Hoskisson’s (2003) insights
by examining the role that home country formal and informal institutions play as
moderators of the I-P relationship. Our overarching contention is that, keeping other
factors constant, the strength of the I-P relationship will vary depending on firms’ home
country institutional environment (Andersson, Cuervo-Cazurra, & Nielsen, 2014), as it
generates conditions that push them to develop resources and capabilities that can sustain
or hinder their global competitive advantage (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Wan & Hoskisson,
2003).
To further illustrate our general contention, we draw on the institution-based view
and COE tradition in strategy. We focus on institutional variables that the institutionbased view and COE traditions in strategy have identified as potentially influential for
firms’ global strategy. Even though the majority of the arguments presented below have
not been empirically examined before, we do not present institution-specific hypotheses.
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The rationale for this approach is two-pronged. First, we are interested in examining the
overarching contention that home country formal and informal institutions are important
moderators of the I-P relationship, rather than exploring in detail the role of specific
institutions. Second, our set of institutional variables should not be viewed as definitive,
nor do we explore the theoretical linkages among those variables. Rather, our goal is to
propose (based on theory) and test (benefiting from the advantages of advanced metaanalytic methods) promising institutional arguments that are consistent with our general
hypothesis. We view our approach as exploratory and consistent with Cantwell, Dunning
and Lundan’s (2010) appreciative theory, which aims to create “an analytical bridge
between empirical investigation and formal models” (Cantwell et al., 2010: 573).
We draw on North’s institutional tradition and consider the impact of two
different but related types of home country institutions: formal and informal (Holmes et
al., 2013; Van Essen et al., 2012). Formal institutions consist of regulatory,
administrative, economic and political arrangements that detail the actions of people,
systems, and organizations through formal laws, regulations, policies, and other written
materials as well as their means of enforcement (North, 1990). Informal institutions are
norms and beliefs that are not codified or documented; rather, they are durable systems of
shared meanings and understandings that contribute to shape societal structures and
behaviors (Holmes et al., 2013).
Formal Institutions and the I-P Relationship
Because formal institutions reflect codified and explicit rules and standards, they provide
influential behavioral guidelines within society mainly through regulatory and political
structures (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). A large number of empirical studies examine the

19

influence of various aspects of home countries’ formal institutions on firms’ behavior and
performance (e.g., Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010; Kirca et al., 2012b; McGahan &
Victer, 2010; Van Essen et al., 2012; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). In reviewing the
literature on formal institutions’ effect on a firm’s global strategy, we follow Holmes et
al. (2013) who argue that the most relevant formal institutions for managers are
regulatory/legal, economic, and political institutions. Much of the research on these
institutions has emphasized that their quality stimulates firms’ creation of specific
resources that rely on particular external inputs or compensate for the lack of other inputs
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011).
Research on legal institutions shows that the degree to which legal traditions
prioritize investor and private property rights helps explain cross-country variation in
financial development and corporate strategies (La Porta et al., 1998). Common law
systems provide stronger protection to both shareholders and creditors (La Porta et al.,
1998). Building on these ideas, Li and Yue (2008) test and find support for the notion that
firms from civil law countries achieve better performance in their international operations
than their common law counterparts. The authors attribute this outcome to civil law
countries’ less supportive legal environment, which forces local firms to develop coping
skills and capabilities that help them compete against their common law counterparts in
the global arena (Elango & Sethi, 2007; Li & Yue, 2008). In sum, these findings imply
that civil law home country traditions are likely to positively moderate the I-P
relationship.
Home country’s business regulations, including antitrust and product liability
regulations, contract enforcement, and financial market oversight, have also been found
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to shape local firms’ access to resources and thus to influence their ability to compete in
the international arena (Chacar et al., 2010; Nachum, 2004; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003).
Two conflicting perspectives have emerged in this area with regard to how these
institutions can shape firms’ performance abroad. The first one suggests that higher
quality business regulations enable local firms’ economic activities because they reduce
firms’ transactions costs by limiting opportunistic behaviors and uncertainty in market
transactions. These regulations produce stronger national economies that provide more
resources, which in turn help firms to develop skills and routines that can strengthen their
ability to profit from their foreign operations (Chacar et al., 2010; Kirca et al., 2012b;
Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Hence, these arguments suggest that home country quality of
government’s business regulations positively moderates the I-P relationship. The second
and conflicting perspective comes from the research on institutional voids (i.e., weak or
missing institutions) and firm performance (e.g., Khanna & Palepu, 1997). It contends
that weaker business regulations at home stimulate local firms’ development of coping
skills, which can be deployed in their foreign operations and translated into competitive
advantages over firms from countries with stronger regulations (Luo & Tung, 2007: 486).
Therefore, this perspective views home country quality of government’s business
regulations as likely to negatively moderate firms’ ability to benefit from
internationalization.
Research also suggests that the political system in an MNE’s home country can
affect the I-P relationship. Relative to autocratic regimes, democratic political systems
create more effective economies, more cooperative relationships between businesses and
governments, and higher levels of transparency due to the large number of influential and
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informed stakeholders embedded within them (Hillman & Keim, 1995). Democratic
political systems also decrease the level of political risk in a country. By political risk, we
refer to the potential for arbitrary and capricious policymaking, which creates uncertainty
for firms (Henisz & Zelner, 2004). Lower levels of political risk can improve
performance by reducing uncertainty and enabling firms to identify and conform to
government priorities and facilitate relationships with government officials (Orr &
Kennedy, 2008). Two competing theoretical logics have emerged regarding the role of
political risk relative to firm’s performance that are similar to some of the arguments
discussed above for business regulations. For example, Wan and Hoskisson (2003) show
that firms headquartered in countries with stronger political institutions (which they
examined together with “legal” and “societal” institutions) tend to profit more from
internationalization than firms from countries with less strong institutions. They argue
that the latter group of firms may “lack globally redeployable capabilities for successfully
competing in foreign markets” (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003: 31). This is because their
competitive advantages usually depend on the lax home country institutional environment
and thus are “in many respects local and [...] likely to dissipate in foreign countries” (32).
However, others provide competing arguments. For example, Puffer, McCarthy and
Boisot (2010) argue that while countries characterized by unstable and unpredictable
political systems are prone to market inefficiencies, such conditions force firms to
develop coping strategies and capabilities to deal with difficult institutional settings. In
turn, these coping skills can help firms manage the challenges they experience in their
foreign operations (Elango & Sethi, 2007). This second perspective emphasizes the
positive effects of weak home country institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) for firms
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when they internationalize: thus, it suggests that home country political risk should
positively moderate the I-P relationship.
Informal Institutions and the I-P Relationship
Culture is an important informal institution in a country (North, 1990; Peng et al., 2008).
Culture is composed of interrelated values and norms (Hofstede, 2001; Parsons & Shils,
1951), as well as repertoires, worldviews, stories, and symbols that people use to
determine strategies for action (Swidler, 1986). Culture is durable and provides a tacit
context for the development of formal institutions (Dunning & Bansal, 1997; Holmes et
al., 2013). A number of empirical studies have shown the impact of national culture on
firms’ administrative heritage (Lubatkin et al., 1998) and performance (Li, Lam, & Qian,
2001). National culture can affect managers’ ability to interpret and respond to strategic
issues (Schneider & De Meyer, 1991), leadership style, human resource management and
other organizational practices (Harzing & Sorge, 2003; House et al., 1999), which in turn
influence a firm’s ability to acquire and deploy strategic resources (Kirca et al., 2005). IB
research has examined how specific dimensions of national cultures affect firm
performance; hence, studying culture can help understand cross-country performance
variation. Based on an extensive review of the relevant literature, we identify three facets
of home country culture that are most likely to moderate the I-P relationship: generalized
trust, future orientation, and uncertainty avoidance.
Research shows that higher levels of home country societal trust, cooperative
norms, and relational activities enable firms to extract greater value from their
international operations (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). This is because societies with higher
levels of trust have stronger cooperative norms that propel economic actors to work
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towards collective benefits (Knack & Keefer, 1997). International strategies have been
linked to a specific type of social trust referred as “generalized trust” (Kramer & Lewicki,
2010; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) and defined as the degree to which a country’s
population perceives people from foreign countries to be trustworthy (Ertug, Cuypers,
Noorderhaven, & Bensaou, 2013). Generalized trust reflects a social categorization effect
in that assumptions or stereotypes associated with membership in a social category (e.g.,
a foreign country) affect how much trust is afforded to members of that group (Kramer &
Lewicki, 2010). Generalized trust is part of a country’s national culture (Ertug et al.,
2013) and varies across countries (Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010; Huff & Kelley, 2003). In
addition to shaping local firms’ managerial practices (Calori, Lubatkin, Very, & Veiga,
1997; Ertug et al., 2013), it is especially relevant for internationalization strategies (e.g.,
Ertug et al., 2013). Indeed, higher generalized trust translates into firms’ greater openness
to foreign activities and practices (Huff & Kelley, 2003; Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe,
1998), as well as a stronger learning orientation in foreign markets (Yilmaz, Alpkan, &
Ergun, 2005). By extension, this stronger openness to foreign activities and markets and
heightened learning orientations can lead to greater propensity to develop relevant
practices, skills and routines that foster firms’ ability to succeed abroad (Chen, Meindl, &
Hui, 1998; Yilmaz et al., 2005; Zahra et al., 2000). Hence, these arguments indicate that
home country generalized trust positively moderates the I-P relationship.
Other facets of home countries’ cultural systems may also be relevant for the I-P
relationship. For example, research suggests that the degree of the home country’s future
orientation (Hofstede, 2001) affects firms’ entrepreneurialism and performance (e.g., Li
et al., 2001). Future orientation suggests an emphasis on long-term rather than short-term
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outcomes; hence, planning and investing activities are geared towards long-term
outcomes (Ashkanasy, Gupta, Mayfield, & Trevor-Roberts, 2004). Prevalent social
norms, such as delayed gratification, prompt individuals and organizations to opt for
savings and forgo immediate spending. Ultimately, this enables capital accumulation
through investments in projects with long-term payoffs and the avoidance of expenditures
associated with short-term payoffs (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Future orientation exists in
cultures that place a premium on loyalties and commitment, and the extension of familial
values to corporate settings (Ouchi, 1981). Future orientation may have an impact on the
supply and demand of capital by framing a country’s investment options as long-term
growth-opportunities. Thus, these ideas suggest that a country’s cultural emphasis on
future orientation could enhance its firms’ ability to extract value from foreign
investments/operations.
Finally, research points to one other facet of the home country’s cultural system
that is relevant for the I-P relationship, namely the degree of home country’s uncertainty
avoidance (Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2003). Uncertainty avoidance reflects the degree to
which individuals within a culture are tolerant of uncertain situations. Individuals and
organizations embedded in cultures with high degrees of uncertainty avoidance tend to be
more easily threatened by ambiguous situations, and prefer structures, regulations and
expert knowledge that mitigate risk (Hofstede, 2001). However, these preferences tend to
create cognitive constraints that limit a firm’s strategic flexibility (Brinckmann, Girchnik,
& Kapsa, 2010; Lubatkin et al., 1998). In turn, the lack of strategic flexibility can harm
firms’ ability to learn from their exposure to international markets and ultimately reduce
their ability to extract rents from them (Mosakowski, 1997). Instead, firms headquartered
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in countries with lower uncertainty avoidance may have better responsiveness, strategic
flexibility and tolerance for improvisational activities that help them to adapt to and
perform more effectively within the requirements and expectations of foreign local
conditions, thereby enhancing their chances for success in foreign markets (Brinckmann
et al., 2010). Thus, home country uncertainty avoidance should negatively moderate the
I-P relationship.
METHODOLOGY
In order to develop a systematic empirical evaluation of the firm-, industry-, home and
host country-level factors driving the I-P relationship that were discussed in the preceding
sections, we conducted a meta-analytic study following established methodological
guidelines (e.g., Buckley, Devinney, & Tang, 2013). In this section, after describing our
sample and coding approach, we discuss our three main meta-analytic approaches,
namely Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analytic techniques (HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985);
meta-analytic regression analysis (MARA; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001); and hierarchical linear
modeling meta-analysis (HiLMMA; Hox, 2002; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We
conclude this section by describing our measurement approach.
Sample and Coding
To identify the highest possible number of studies testing the I-P relationship, we used
five search strategies. First, we consulted several review articles (e.g., Hennart, 2011; Hitt
et al., 2006b; Li, 2007) and six prior meta-analytic articles (Bausch & Krist, 2007; Kirca
et al., 2011; Kirca et al., 2012b; Kirca et al., 2012b; Ruigrok & Wagner, 2004; Yang &
Driffield, 2012). Second, we explored five major electronic databases using the following
search terms: “multinationality”, “MNC”, “international diversification”,
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“internationalization”, “geographic diversification”, “international expansion”, and
“globalization” (Hitt et al., 2006b; Kirca et al., 2011; Kirca et al., 2012a, 2012b). Third,
we conducted a manual search in journals across the disciplines of economics,
entrepreneurship, management, and finance that have published articles on the I-P
relationship from the year of the first publication of each of the journals to 2014. Fourth,
after collecting an initial set of studies, we gathered all studies cited in the previously
retrieved articles, along with all articles citing them, using Google Scholar and ISI Web of
Knowledge. Fifth, we directly contacted researchers who had previously written one or
several papers relevant to this topic but did not report effect size information or whose
studies we could not retrieve by other means. We asked them for a correlation table,
sample size, regression output, and additional empirical studies. Combined, these
strategies yielded a final sample of 359 primary studies (288 published and 71 working
papers) with samples of firms from 32 countries across the 1972-2012 time period. In
Figure 1.1, we show the number of primary studies for each year included in our metaanalysis and the growth trajectory of research on the I-P relationship.2
We proceeded by reading all articles and by developing a coding protocol (Lipsey
& Wilson, 2001) to extract data on all relevant variables and study characteristics. Two
authors coded all the data, and a third author re-checked all effect sizes to assess the
degree of agreement in the extracted information from primary studies (Stanley &
Doucouliagos, 2012). We resolved remaining discrepancies via discussion until we
reached a consensus.

2

We were not able to determine the year for eight working papers. Thus, those papers are not included in
Figure 1.1.
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Meta-analytic Procedures
We used three analytical procedures depending on our research objectives.
HOMA procedure. We use Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analytic techniques
(HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985) to measure the meta-analytic mean correlation between
internationalization and performance and the corresponding confidence interval. In
addition, this procedure allows us to assess whether the heterogeneity of the effect size
distribution in the I-P relationship depends on the different operationalizations of the two
main constructs of interest (i.e., internationalization and performance) and variations in the
internationalization processes that firms pursue. It also enables us to examine the shape of
the I-P relationship. To carry out HOMA analyses, we use both Pearson product-moment
correlation r and the partial correlation rxy.z as effect sizes because these are easily
interpretable and scale-free measures of linear association. We use r, as this is the most
commonly reported effect size statistic in management (Geyskens, Krishnan, Steenkamp,
& Cunha, 2009). In addition, we use rxy.z, which represents the association between I(X)
and P(Y), given a set of n control variables (Z), and allows us to incorporate studies in
which bivariate effect size information was not reported. Exploring partial correlations is
useful for several additional reasons. First, rxy.z gives insights into the direction of
causality between two variables, provided that the authors of the primary study corrected
for endogeneity. Second, rxy.z controls for the effect of other variables and can be used to
determine the minimally required set of control variables for future studies (see our
discussion about the MARA technique below). Furthermore, it can also provide
information about nonlinearity when the authors of primary studies have incorporated
squared transformations of linear terms in their regression work.
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When primary studies reported effect size statistics other than r and rxy.z, we
transformed these to an r value. When we encountered multiple measurements of the
focal effect, for example due to the reporting of results for several different
operationalizations of internationalization, all effects were included in our overall analysis
and we unpacked them later with subgroup analyses (Bijmolt & Pieters, 2001).
MARA procedure. We use meta-analytic regression analysis (MARA; Lipsey &
Wilson, 2001) to examine the impact of formal and informal institutions on the I-P
relationship. Similar to multiple regression approaches, MARA estimates a linear
regression model in which the dependent variable (in our case, the correlation between IP in a given primary sample) is regressed on a set of predictors (which are the potential
moderators of the focal relationship) (Carney et al., 2011). We weight the effect sizes
again by their inverse variance weight to account for differences in the precision of the
information contained in them. We follow Van Essen et al. (2015) and a long tradition of
meta-analytic research in economics (e.g., Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012) and use r and
rxy.z as our effect size estimates for the MARA procedure, which, in our case, captures the
I-P relationship, with a given set of n control variables. One of the unique advantages of
using MARA is that it allows modeling the variance in the effect size distribution in light
of home country-level institutional variables that were not included in the primary studies
(Van Essen, Van Oosterhout, & Heugens, 2013). The institutional variables are measured
longitudinally, which allows us to match the individual effect sizes to the temporally
closest available institutional variables.
HiLMMA procedure. Finally, we rely on hierarchical linear modeling metaanalysis (HiLMMA; Raudenbusch & Bryk, 2002) to assess whether primary study results
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are consistent across countries, and if not, which percentage of the variability in the effect
size contribution depends on a firm’s country of origin. We also use HiLMMA as a
robustness check to rule out the possibility that stochastic dependencies between multiple
effect sizes harvested from a single primary study biased our HOMA and MARA
parameter estimates. Specifically, we interpret each effect size as a level 1 observation,
nesting it in the study from which it was derived, and coding this study as a level 2
predictor. If the intercept of the standardized HiLMMA test is comparable to the mean
effect size retrieved by the HOMA test, it signals the absence of estimation bias due to
stochastic dependencies. Inversely, a significant difference between the two values would
indicate the presence of such biases.
Measures of Performance and Internationalization
Firm performance. Building on the findings by Hitt and colleagues (2006b), we
include four types of firm-level performance measures: (1) accounting-based measures
(e.g., Hitt et al., 1997; Thomas & Eden, 2004), such as ROE, ROA, ROS, ROI, profit
margin, and profit; (2) market-based measures (e.g., Thomas & Eden, 2004), such as
stock market performance, market to book value, Tobin’s Q, and excess market value; (3)
sales growth (e.g., Zahra et al., 2000); and (4) survey-based measures (e.g., Dhanaraj &
Beamish, 2003), which capture respondents’ perceptions of firm performance.
Internationalization. Based on Sullivan (1994) and Thomas and Eden (2004), we
include 11 internationalization variables grouped into five categories. (1) Depth of
internationalization. We include the following measures of depth: foreign sales to total
sales (Tallman & Li, 1996); foreign assets to total assets (Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999);
foreign employees to total employees (Brock & Yaffe, 2008); and export to total sales
(Lu & Beamish, 2001). Together, these ratios suggest the extent to which the firm’s
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activities are conducted outside the home country (Thomas & Eden, 2004). (2) Breadth
(scope) of internationalization. We include the following measures of breadth: number of
countries (Delios & Beamish, 1999); number of regions (Kim, Hoskisson, & Wan, 2004);
dispersion across countries (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003); and dispersion across regions
(Hitt et al., 1997). Together, these variables capture the span of a firm’s foreign
operations (Thomas & Eden, 2004). (3) Foreign subsidiaries (e.g., Vermeulen &
Barkema, 2002), measured as the number of the firm’s foreign affiliates in a given year,
and the ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries (Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997).
(4) Internationalization dummy (Chakrabarti, Vidal, & Mitchell, 2011), which takes value
of 1 if the firm has an international presence and 0 otherwise. (5) Composite measure
(Sanders & Carpenter, 1998), which measures the internationalization of a firm in a given
year by integrating different internationalization measures into a composite indicator.
Institutional Moderators
Formal institutions. As proposed in our preceding review, we examine three sets
of formal institutions. First, we assess the role of a country’s legal tradition on the I-P
relationship in terms of civil law vs. common law. Specifically, we use a time invariant
dummy variable that equals 1 if the country relies on the English common law system
and 0 otherwise (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997). These data are extracted from the database
compiled by the University of Ottawa’s JuriGlobe. Second, to capture economic
regulatory institutions, we consider the quality of government regulations targeting
starting, operating and closing a business. Specifically, we use the home country’s degree
of business freedom, which measures the quality of the regulations of business behavior
such as licensing and registration requirements. This measure comes from the Index of
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Economic Freedom, which is computed by the Heritage Foundation on a yearly basis
(Heritage Foundation, 2015) and has also been used widely in the international
management research (e.g., Meyer & Sinani, 2009; Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, &
Chittoor, 2010). This variable is time variant. Third, we explore the role of political
institutions by examining the degree to which a country’s political structure creates
political risks for firms and investors. Specifically, we use Witold Henisz’s Political
Constraint Index dataset (POLCON V), which measures political risk in terms of the
degree of restrictions on policy changes and the distribution of power across political
branches (Henisz, 2000). The index ranges between 0 (most hazardous) and 1 (most
constrained, i.e., stable) and has been extensively used in IB research (e.g., Guler &
Guillén, 2010; Lu, 2002). This index is time variant. Also, we reverse code the index, so
that higher levels indicate more politically risky home countries.
Informal institutions. As discussed in our review, we examine the role of three
informal institutions. First, we examine the moderating role of generalized trust, which
reflects the degree to which a country’s citizens trust members of other nations. Data for
this time variant variable were obtained from the World Value Survey, which has been
used extensively in international research on generalized trust (e.g., Ertug et al., 2013;
Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010). Second, we examine the home country’s future orientation,
which is “the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies engage in such
behavior as planning, investing in the future, and delaying individual or collective
gratification” (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004: 12). This measure
comes from the GLOBE project, which has been widely used by scholars exploring the
management implications of national culture (e.g., Sarala & Vaara, 2010) and is time
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invariant. Third, we assess home country’s uncertainty avoidance, which is “the extent to
which members of an organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty by relying on
established social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices” (House et al., 2004: 11).
This time invariant measure is also drawn from the GLOBE project.
Control Variables
We also include numerous firm-, industry-, home and host country-level control variables
in the MARA model. To control for definitional effects, we include separate dummy
variables for the different definitions of internationalization and performance that we
discussed above, using foreign subsidiaries and market-based measures as the two
reference categories. We also include dummy variables measuring whether
internationalization was lagged (1) or not (0) in the studies.
To control for methodological artifacts, we test for the “file drawer problem”
(Rosenthal, 1979) by including a dummy variable denoting whether a study was
published or not (reference group). To allow for the possibility that the focal relationship
might change over time, we control for the median year of sample window. We also
include dummy variables indicating whether effect sizes were based on a panel or crosssectional (reference group) design, and whether they were derived from a study
controlling for endogeneity of internationalization on firm performance or not (reference
group). We control for type of firm, namely whether the sample includes only public
firms, private firms or both (reference group). We also control for firm size, namely
whether the sample includes only large firms, small medium size enterprises (SMEs) or
both (reference group). We control for the four industries in which sector-specific results
were available: chemical, consultancy, high tech, pharma/biotech and mixed (reference
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group). We assess whether primary studies controlled for industry effects or not
(reference group), year effects or not (reference group), and we include the number of
variables included in the regression models. We also include a control denoting whether
the sample included firms from multiple countries or not (reference group). Finally, we
include home country total GDP to control for the size of the home country’s economy as
it could influence the I-P relationship (Elango & Sethi, 2007).
To account for the effects of specific omitted variables, we incorporate a set of
dummy variables indicating whether the following variables were included (yes = 1) in
the model from which a given effect size was derived: firm previous international
experience, prior firm performance measure, firm size, firm age, R&D intensity,
advertising intensity, product diversification, debt to equity level, firm risk, firm growth,
capital intensity, CEO/Top Management Team (TMT) international experience, board
independence, ownership concentration, inside ownership, foreign ownership, family
ownership, business group affiliation, industry performance, host country potential (i.e.,
the opportunities associated with operations in the host country), and country distance
(i.e., the institutional distance between the home and the host country).
RESULTS
I-P Relationship: Size, Shape and Related Methodological Issues
HOMA results. We present in Table 1.1 the results for our r-based (left-hand
panel) and rxy.z-based (right-hand panel) HOMA analyses. Like prior meta-analyses
(Bausch & Kirst, 2007: r-based mean = 0.06; Kirca et al., 2011: r-based mean = 0.10;
Ruigrok & Wagner, 2004: r-based mean = 0.04), we find that, overall,
internationalization has a small but statistically significant positive effect on firm
performance, albeit smaller when focusing on partial correlation (r-based mean = 0.06;
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rxy.z-based mean = 0.02) and with the caveat that the variance contained in both effect size
distributions is high (r-distribution: Q = 16,663.38, I2 = 0.97; rxy.z-distribution: Q =
26,479.83, I2 = 0.95). Under these conditions, the mean is best interpreted as an average
rather than a common true correlation value (Hedges & Olkin, 1985: 235), implying that
the I-P relationship has a negative sign in several samples and also suggesting influence
from moderators. Thus, further moderator analyses are needed. The funnel plot presented
in Figure 1.2, which represents sample size against effect size, visually depicts the
heterogeneity present in the effect size distribution. The spread of the retrieved effect
sizes is considerable, and the distribution occupies broad zones left and right of the zero
mark.
Sub-group HOMA analyses reveal that the heterogeneity in study findings is at
least partially driven by how firm performance is operationalized. Based on the r-based
HOMA analysis, we find that, first, the measures of firm performance are positively but
not highly correlated with one another (r-based mean = 0.33). Second, we find that,
whereas the mean effect sizes based on accounting measures (r-based mean = 0.06; rxy.z based mean = 0.01 n.s.), market measures (r-based mean = 0.05; rxy.z -based mean = 0.03)
and sales growth (r-based mean = 0.05; rxy.z -based mean = 0.04) are close to the overall
mean effect size, those based on self-reported survey data are substantially higher (rbased mean = 0.14; rxy.z -based mean = 0.09).
Consistent with prior research (Sullivan, 1994), we find that the
internationalization construct is multidimensional and that these dimensions are far from
perfectly correlated with each other: the mean correlation between internationalization
variables is 0.35 in the r-based HOMA analysis. This result points to the need to further

35

examine the role of this focal construct: only the measures of internationalization by
depth (r-based mean = 0.06; rxy.z -based mean = 0.01) or breadth (r-based mean = 0.07;
rxy.z -based mean = 0.06) are statistically significant with a positive sign in both analyses.
This suggests that the differential operationalizations of the internationalization variable
moderate the overall I-P relationship.
In the rxy.z -based HOMA analyses, we also test for non-linear relationships
between internationalization and firm performance. Neither the quadratic nor the cubic
relationship is supported, as the quadratic and cubic terms are statistically insignificant.
Finally, in only seven percent of all rxy.z, the Z-vector also contained an
instrumental variable to address potential endogeneity issues. We find in the HOMA
analyses that endogeneity is an important issue because the meta-analytic mean for
studies using endogeneity corrections is considerably lower than that for studies not using
such corrections. Importantly, the statistically significant overall effect of the I-P
relationship disappears for studies using endogeneity corrections (-0.01 (n.s.) vs. 0.02).
In the HOMA analyses, we also consider the heterogeneity of the
internationalization process and its potential influence on firm performance. Specifically,
we test whether speed and rhythm of the internationalization process affect firm
performance (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). Our results show that the rhythm of the
internationalization process does not affect firm performance (r-based mean = -0.05 n.s.;
rxy.z -based mean = 0.01 n.s.). Speed of internationalization is not a consistently relevant
moderator of the I-P relationship, as shown by a coefficient that is both positive and
statistically insignificant in the r-based analyses (i.e., r-based mean = 0.01 n.s.) but
negative and statistically significant in the rxy.z -based analyses (rxy.z -based mean = -0.04).
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MARA results. These results further illustrate the importance of controlling for
measurement, methodological, and model specification artifacts and are reported in Table
1.2. In terms of measurement concerns, they show that the coefficient estimates of
breadth of internationalization (β = 0.05, p < 0.01) and survey measures of performance
(β = 0.08, p < 0.01) are the largest among the statistically significant estimates of the
internationalization and firm performance definitions, respectively. These results are
consistent with the HOMA results and also confirm previous findings (i.e., Kirca et al.,
2012b; Thomas & Eden, 2004) suggesting that breadth of internationalization has a
stronger effect on firm performance than depth.
The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate for the published
study variable (β = 0.02, p < 0.05) indicates that the “file drawer problem” is present in
the I-P literature. Studies reporting greater effects have a better chance of being
published. In addition, the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate for the
median year of the sampling window (β = 0.002, p < 0.01) suggests that studies using
more recent samples find stronger I-P relationship effects. Our MARA results also show
a negative and statistically significant moderating effect of the endogeneity control
variable (β = -0.05, p < 0.01), confirming that studies using endogeneity corrections
report weaker effects. In addition, we see a positive and statistically significant
coefficient estimate for our large firm control variable (β = 0.02, p < 0.01), which
suggests that the I-P relationship is stronger for large firms. In terms of industry controls,
we find that, relative to the multiple industry samples, the banking, finance and insurance
(β = -0.04, p < 0.01), consultancy (β = -0.05, p < 0.01), high tech (β = -0.08, p < 0.01),
and pharma/biotech (β = -0.08, p < 0.01) industries are all characterized by a weaker
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influence of internationalization on firm performance. However, this relationship is
stronger for firms in the chemical industry (β = 0.10, p < 0.01). Finally, we find that the
home country’s total GDP has a statistically significant (albeit moderate) effect on the
focal relationship (β = -0.00, p < 0.10).
Finally, the MARA results also indicate that omitted variable biases frequently
affect I-P studies (see discussion of this issue in Kirca et al., 2011). In particular, failing
to control for: i) prior firm performance, ii) firm size, iii) firm age, iv) firm risk, v) firm
growth, vi) CEO/TMT international experience, vii) foreign ownership, and viii)
institutional distance between the firm’s home and host countries may distort estimates of
the focal relationship. Therefore, such variables should be included in the vector of
control variables in future studies to prevent omitted variable biases.
Country-level Variance of Effect Sizes
The variance in the effect size distribution is partially detailed in Table 1.3 by dividing
the overall sample into country-specific subsamples. A formal meta-analytic hierarchical
linear model estimation (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), in which effect sizes are nested in
countries, shows that home country effects account for 12-22 percent of the variance in
the effect size distribution. A casual inspection of these sub-sample results indicates that
a significant amount of variance resides at the home country level of analysis. First, there
are countries in which internationalization has statistically significant negative effects on
firm performance in both analyses (Kenya and Finland). Second, there are 14 countries,
developed and emerging alike, in which the focal relationship is statistically insignificant
(Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands,
New Zeeland, Pakistan, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey and Uruguay). In a third set of countries
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(in China, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Russia, Sweden and the U.S.),
internationalization results in statistically significant performance advantages in either rbased or rxy.z -based HOMA analyses. Finally, in seven countries (Brazil, Finland,
Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, Switzerland and the U.K.), the focal relationship is
statistically significant in both analyses and ranges from small to strong positive values.
In sum, these results indicate that the strength of the focal relationship varies across
contexts, thus providing the impetus for an examination of the institutional home country
moderator effects.
Home Country Institutional Moderators of the I-P Relationship
The results of the MARA procedure, which pertain to the moderating effects of home
country formal and informal institutions, are presented in Table 1.2.3 The dependent
variable for each model is the correlation between internationalization and firm
performance. The results in Table 1.2 show that the coefficient estimate for the law
tradition dummy is not statistically significant (β = -0.01, p > 0.10). Therefore, home
country legal tradition does not moderate the relationship between internationalization
and performance. Results in Table 1.2 show a statistically significant negative coefficient
estimate for quality of business regulations (β = -0.001, p < 0.05). This suggests that the
home country’s business regulations negatively moderate the focal relationship and, thus,
internationalization has a less positive effect on firm performance when the quality of
business regulations is higher. Finally, home country political risk positively moderates

3

Multicollinearity between country-level variables did not constitute a significant problem, as the highest
correlation is point 0.71 (between generalized trust and common law tradition). Moreover, when one of the
variables is left out of the model, the coefficient estimates remain basically unchanged, which also suggests
that our results are not affected by multicollinearity issues.

39

the I-P relationship (β = 0.08, p < 0.01), implying that internationalization has a more
positive effect on firm performance when political risk is higher.
The results in Table 1.2 show that generalized trust positively moderates the focal
relationship (β = 0.001, p < 0.01), suggesting that internationalization has a more positive
effect on firm performance when home country’s levels of generalized trust are higher.
Table 1.2 results also show that the focal relationship is positively moderated by home
country future orientation, albeit at a marginal level of statistical significance (β = 0.04, p
< 0.10). Higher home country future orientation is associated with a stronger influence of
internationalization on firm performance. Finally, in Table 1.2, the coefficient estimate of
uncertainty avoidance is negative and statistically significant (β = -0.03, p < 0.01),
suggesting that internationalization has a less positive effect on firm performance when
home country uncertainty avoidance is higher.
Additional Robustness Tests
We perform additional robustness tests to assess whether stochastic dependencies
deriving from the harvesting of multiple effect sizes from a single study caused material
problems in our data and findings. First, we run a separate HiLMMA analysis
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Van Essen et al., 2012a), in which we modeled effect sizes
(level 1 observations) as nested in studies (level 2 observations). The corrected mean
correlations (r-based mean = 0.04; rxy.z-based mean = 0.03), which in HiLMMA are
denoted as the level 1 intercept γ0 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), are similar to the
uncorrected mean correlations between I-P (see Table 1.1). This diagnostic test thus
shows that stochastic interdependencies between effect sizes deriving from similar
studies do not influence our results. Second, we conduct a separate HOMA test in which
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all studies are represented by a single value by combining all individual measurements of
the focal effect into a linear composite (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990: 457-460). The results
show an r-based mean correlation of 0.06 and an rxy.z-based mean correlation of 0.02,
suggesting that the incorporation of multiple measurements of the focal effect in the
HOMA analyses does not affect our results. Finally, we test for the effect of outliers in
both HOMA and MARA models (Buckley et al., 2013) and confirm that the results are
not affected by observations with extreme values.
DISCUSSION
Research on the I-P relationship is extensive, and yet its findings, including those about
the sign and shape of the relationship, have been inconclusive. To reconcile these
inconsistencies, scholars have conducted a number of meta-analyses (e.g., Bausch &
Krist, 2007; Kirca et al., 2011; Kirca et al., 2012b; Ruigrok & Wagner, 2004; Yang &
Driffield, 2012), which have also yielded inconclusive findings. Our review suggests that
a primary reason for this lack of consistent results is that scholars have overlooked the
moderating influence of firms’ home country institutional contexts on the I-P
relationship, even though many have argued that home country institutions have a strong
influence on how well firms are able to benefit from their internationalization efforts
(Bausch & Krist, 2007; Hitt et al., 2006b; Kirca et al., 2012b; Matysiak & Bausch, 2012;
Ruigrok, Amann, & Wagner 2007; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). This study addresses this
research gap, and finds that the nature of the I-P relationship does indeed depend on
different formal and informal home country institutions. Specifically, five out of the six
examined home country institutional variables moderate the I-P relationship. Hence, the
lack of attention to the importance of home country conditions is a key problem of the
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extant research on the I-P relationship. In addition, these results contribute to both the
institution-based view of strategy and research on the performance benefits of
internationalization by providing evidence that the inputs, norms, standards and rules of
firms’ home countries enable them to acquire, develop and deploy resources that help
them achieve (or prevent them from achieving) competitive advantages over firms from
other countries. Below we illustrate our main contributions and their relevance for future
research on the I-P relationship.
Linking Research on the I-P Relationship and the Institution Based View in
Strategy
Our first contribution to the global strategy literature is the demonstration of the need for
the integration of arguments from the research on the I-P relationship and the institutionbased view of strategy to illustrate the moderating effects of home country formal and
informal institutions on this relationship. In particular, our results show that, except for
civil law institutions, all of the examined formal and informal institutions moderate the IP relationship. First, quality of business regulations negatively moderates the I-P
relationship, in contrast with some prior research that suggested it might have a positive
moderating effect. Our results are in line with Batjargal and colleagues’ (2013) findings
that strong regulations often are inefficient (too bureaucratic) and thus have a negative
influence on internationalization and other types of economic activity (see also: Arregle,
Miller, Hitt, & Beamish, 2013). Further, we contend that weak business regulations in the
home country may help firms to develop coping skills that they can then leverage in their
foreign operations (Luo & Tung, 2007: 486) and require less managerial time and effort
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for bureaucratic red tape. Thus, weaker home country regulatory environments allow
managers more flexibility in using their resources to explore international markets.
Second, we find that firms from less politically risky home countries receive
fewer performance benefits from internationalization. Favorable political environments
provide firms with better growth opportunities in their home country, and fewer
opportunities in foreign markets to achieve greater returns. In contrast, firms from
countries with higher levels of political risk can benefit more from their
internationalization as they can access opportunities and resources that are not available
in their home markets, increasing their probability of improving their performance.
Finally, political risk may drive firms to develop capabilities for managing difficult or
unsupportive political institutions in their home country, which strengthen their ability to
manage the internal and external complexity in their host countries (Cuervo-Cazurra,
2011).
Third, regarding informal institutions, our results show that firms from home
countries with higher generalized trust (i.e., where citizens are more trusting of people
from other countries), longer-term orientation, and lower uncertainty avoidance are likely
to reap greater returns from internationalization. We believe that embeddedness in a
home country with the aforementioned institutional characteristics helps firms to better
deal with the inherent challenges involved in internationalization. Internationalization is a
long-term strategy that entails risk because it requires firms to develop new capabilities,
overcome liabilities of foreignness, and manage complex and sometimes distant
international activities (e.g., Hitt, Li, & Xu, 2015; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Vahlne &
Ivarsson, 2014). As a result, higher generalized trust, long-term orientation and
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uncertainty acceptance can help benefit from internationalization by enabling the
development of coping skills, other capabilities, and a general learning orientation. Trust
is often critical for building effective relationships with foreign stakeholders (e.g.,
suppliers, customers, government units) and engaging new environments. A long-term
orientation helps firms look beyond the temporary effects of initial costs on long-term
performance, and commit to opportunities that have longer-term payoffs. Finally,
entering new international markets is often inherently uncertain, such that trying to avoid
uncertainty causes managers to overlook markets with the greatest economic
opportunities. On the other hand, firms that are comfortable with uncertainty are more
likely to identify and exploit more risky but highly beneficial market opportunities.
These results have interesting and important implications for future research on
the I-P relationship. First, we have illustrated the importance of several home country
formal and informal institutions as moderators of the I-P relationship, but additional
facets of the home country institutional context should be examined in future research.
Second, our work could be further advanced through primary research aimed at
understanding whether managers’ perceptions of home country institutional factors shape
their decisions about global expansion and their firms’ ability to profit from it. Such an
investigation could shed light on whether managers’ enactment of their home country
institutional environment is a salient feature of its moderating effect on the I-P
relationship. Third, given the significant effects of numerous firm-, industry-, and host
country-level factors, additional interactive, within- and cross-level relationships could be
explored. For example, future research could examine how the home country institutional
environment moderates the I-P relationship depending on firms’ engagement in upstream
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or downstream internationalization strategies. The same relationship could be examined
based on firms’ motivations for internationalization (e.g., market expansion vs. access to
valuable/needed resources) (Luo & Tung, 2007).
Exploring the Polycentric Nature of the Home Country Institutional Environment
Our second contribution pertains to the integration of both formal and informal
institutions into the analysis of the moderating effects of institutional embeddedness on
the I-P relationship. The limited amount of existing research that has accounted for home
country institutional context has largely focused on individual attributes of formal
institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011), even though institutional environments contain
multiple formal and informal institutions that can affect MNE performance. By
examining multiple formal and informal institutions across many countries over a long
period of time, our study suggests that the polycentric and complex nature of the
institutional environments in which MNEs operate needs to be examined more closely
(Batjargal et al., 2013; Marano & Kostova, 2016). In particular, our results support
Ostrom’s (2005) assertion that institutional polycentrism, or institutions arising from
multiple centers of power, can generate concurrent effects on firms, implying that
managers should consider such polycentricism when making strategic decisions (e.g.,
entering new international markets) (Batjargal et al., 2013). For this reason, our study
extends research on institutional complexity and suggests that future research on
international strategy should also consider such complexity. We believe that
configurations of both formal and informal institutions should be examined to accurately
understand the institutional effects that shape the I-P relationship. While we have already
shown that several sets of home country institutions help explain the strength of the I-P
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relationship, some of these institutions may also interact (Holmes et al., 2013) to form
configurations that managers should consider. A logical next step would be to identify
specific configurations of home country institutions and determine if they have unique
effects on this relationship. Although several approaches could be used for such research,
fuzzy-set analysis might be especially suited for this type of study (e.g., Fiss, 2011;
Pajunen, 2008).
Our results also suggest that future empirical studies on the I-P relationship should
consider firms from a variety of home countries to increase the accuracy and
generalizability of their results. Because the home country institutional context matters, it
is important to move beyond models that simply control for home country and instead
include related variables in the theoretical framework and methodological design. As a
result, we believe that multilevel modeling and theorizing, which we also implemented in
some of our meta-analytic tests, should be used more frequently in research on this topic
as it tests theories that include effects at multiple levels of analysis (Hitt, Beamish,
Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007; Peterson, Arregle, & Martin, 2012). One of the main
advantages of multilevel theorizing and modeling is that they enable researchers to
account for the partial effects of individuals’ and firms’ inclusions in higher-level
collectivities and possible interactive effects between levels (Rousseau, 1985). Building
on our findings, future research could use a multilevel approach to further investigate
other home and/or host country- and even region-level nesting effects on the I-P
relationship. However, one of the challenges associated with multilevel modeling
statistical techniques such as hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) and random coefficient
modeling (RCM) is accessing appropriate data, because the examination of such
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multilevel effects requires larger cross-country samples (see Peterson et al., 2012 for a
discussion of this issue). We also believe that case studies and other types of qualitative
research could be fruitfully used to investigate less explored factors at different levels of
analysis that may shape firms’ ability to benefit from their internationalization efforts,
including (as we further illustrate below) the role of managerial cognition and various
process outcomes associated with internationalization.
Finally, scholars could build on our results by investigating the mutual influences
between MNEs and their institutional environments. While we emphasized firms’
reactions to institutional forces, it is also important to examine the extent to which these
organizations can affect the home country contexts where they operate, perhaps by
studying the co-evolution of MNEs and their institutional environments (Saka-Helmhout
& Geppert, 2011). Such an approach would require shifting from a conceptualization of
institutions as variables, and instead embracing “an approach that is historical, contextual
and multidisciplinary in nature” (Cantwell et al., 2010: 580-581).
Exploring the Role of Methodological Heterogeneity in the I-P research
Our third contribution is methodological and relates to our meta-analytical tests’ reliance
on both Pearson product-moment correlation and partial correlation as effect sizes – a
significant improvement from existing meta-analyses on this topic. The Pearson productmoment correlation is the most commonly reported effect size statistic in management
(Geyskens et al., 2009) and has been used in most previous meta-analyses on the I-P
relationship. However, as we illustrated in the methods section, an exclusive reliance on
Pearson product-moment correlation precludes existing meta-analyses from generating
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conclusive findings on the sign and shape of the I-P relationship (Stanley &
Doucouliagos, 2012).
Our results indicate that internationalization has an overall positive effect on
performance that is robust across samples of 1,558,455 firms for the bivariate analyses
and 2,576,772 firms for the partial analyses from 32 countries between 1972 and 2012.
However, this effect is small (r-based mean = 0.06; rxy.z-based mean = 0.02, p < 0.05) and
varies significantly by country. This finding suggests that scholars interested in the I-P
relationship should accept a modest positive association between internationalization and
performance as a stylized fact (Helfat, 2007), while also understanding that the true
nature of the relationship is substantially contingent on home country factors. This also
implies that there is less need for further empirical evidence on the I-P relationship,
except perhaps for examining the influences of specific national contexts. This result is
also consistent with previous meta-analytic findings (e.g., Bausch & Kirst, 2007; Kirca et
al., 2011). But, in contrast to previous meta-analyses by Kirca et al. (2012b) and Yang
and Driffield (2012) that validated a U-shaped relationship, we do not find support for a
non-linear I-P relationship. However, the appropriate meta-analytic approach to test for
non-linear relationships involves using partial correlations as effect sizes as we have done
in this study (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012). We further illustrate the differences
between our meta-analytic approach and findings and those of prior meta-analyses on the
I-P relationship in Table 1.4.
In all, our results suggest that the benefits of internationalization when examined
in the aggregate, including economies of scale and scope, location-based advantages,
international arbitrage, broader learning and market opportunities (Cardinal et al., 2011;
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Hitt et al., 2006b) barely exceed its costs. They also emphasize the importance of further
examining the sources of heterogeneity in firms’ ability to benefit from
internationalization. In this study we focused our attention on an important (and, to date,
scarcely explored) source of such variance, namely country of origin effects. Thus, there
is need for additional research in this area. For example, while the COE tradition points
to the importance of institutionally-derived cognitive imprinting for firms’ global
strategy, scant attention has been paid thus far to the role of managerial cognition in
shaping the internationalization choices that companies make (Maitland & Sammartino,
2015; Zahra, Korri, & Yu, 2005). Modeling the role of managerial cognition could shed
light on how managers “perceive and construct their industries’ boundaries and
opportunities at home and in host countries” (Zahra et al., 2005: 130). Applying
qualitative methods as used in the study by Maitland and Sammartino (2015) could be
useful for such a study. Relatedly, our review also shows that we still know relatively
little about the type of process outcomes that are generated by firms’ internationalization
efforts, including operational improvements (Chang, 1995) and organizational learning
(Zahra et al., 2000), which can also contribute to performance outcomes (Hitt et al.,
2006b), thus requiring more research.
Relatedly, our review of the literature on the I-P relationship also revealed that the
process of internationalization continues to receive limited attention; research focuses
more on the drivers of speed and rhythm of internationalization and less on their
performance-related consequences. While our meta-analytical results indicate that speed
and rhythm of internationalization are not consistently important for firm performance,
the limited number of studies exploring the performance implications of the
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internationalization process suggests that more research is needed to achieve definitive
conclusions. Such research would strengthen our understanding of the internal and
external contexts in which internationalization decisions are made and their influences on
why those decisions are made and how they are implemented.
In our meta-analytical tests we examine other methodological drivers of the
heterogeneity in the effect size distribution for the I-P relationship and find that the
operationalization of both variables contributes significantly to such variance.
Specifically, survey-based measures of performance show the largest effects, while mean
effect sizes based on accounting and market measures are more closely clustered around
the overall mean effect size. This is consistent with the notion that, as illustrated by
previous studies (e.g., Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), survey-derived
measures of performance can be inflated. In addition, we find that breadth of
internationalization has stronger positive effects on performance than depth of
internationalization, number of foreign subsidiaries, the ratio of foreign subsidiaries to
total subsidiaries, and the internationalization dummy, which captures whether the firm
has an international presence. This suggests that the heterogeneity of institutional
contexts across which the firm operates (as implied by our measures of breadth of
internationalization) creates learning opportunities for new knowledge that the firm can
internalize to improve its performance (Zahra et al., 2000). These results are consistent
with the view that exposure to diverse environments promotes system openness and
learning of both universal and tacit knowledge (Zahra et al., 2000). They also suggest that
future empirical tests should consider more carefully whether the chosen measures of
internationalization and performance are consistent with their underlying theoretical
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model (for a discussion of these issues see also: Hennart, 2011; Hitt et al., 2006b;
Oesterle & Richta, 2013; Thomas & Eden, 2004). Additionally, our results show that the
occurrence of omitted variable biases in I-P studies is common and that failing to control
for any or all of the eight variables included in Table 1.2 may lead to distorted estimates
of the focal relationship. Thus, future research should include these variables as controls
to prevent omitted variable biases.
Furthermore, our findings illustrate the importance of examining time-related
effects by showing that studies with more recent samples display a stronger I-P
relationship. Temporal effects have received limited attention in international strategy
research, but are clearly important for understanding the magnitude of outcomes of firm
strategies (e.g., Hough, 2006). We thus recommend that future research use multilevel
growth modeling to analyze the I-P relationship and capture systematic patterns of
change in it over time (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Multilevel growth modeling also has
the advantage of avoiding the simplifying assumption that all firms have the same form
of change over time, which is typical for most classical regression-based analyses. It can
also mitigate biases inherent in other panel data methods, such as increased likelihood of
making a Type I error, stronger correlations between observations that are temporally
close to each other than observations that are temporally far apart (Bliese & Ployhart,
2002), and heterogeneity in the residuals that can also affect the statistical tests by
making them more liberal (Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010). Furthermore, it facilitates
examining how the baseline level and the trend of firm’s performance over time are
influenced by factors at different levels of analysis (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002).
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TABLE 1.1: HOMA Meta-Analytic Results
Predictor
Internationalization to performance
Endogeneity control
Quadratic relation
Linear term
Quadratic term
Cubic relation
Linear term
Quadratic term
Cubic term

Pearson product-moment correlation (r)
k
N
Mean SE
Q test
I2
640 1,558,455 0.06* 0.00 16,663.38 0.97

Partial correlation coefficient (rxy.z)
k
N
Mean SE
Q test
1,190 2,576,772 0.02* 0.00 26,479.83
84
478,157
-0.01
0.01 1,170.13

I2
0.95
0.93

183
183

641,649
641,649

0.03*
-0.00

0.01
0.00

1,970.21
1,308.62

0.91
0.86

75
75
75

905,934
905,934
905,934

-0.02*
0.01
-0.01

0.01
0.01
0.00

615.38
637.14
397.08

0.88
0.88
0.81
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Measures of Firm performance
Accounting measures
Market measures
Sales growth
Survey-based measures

413
117
62
48

1,003,484
474,180
61,437
19,354

0.06*
0.05*
0.05*
0.14*

0.01
0.01
0.01
0.03

12,189.44
2,998.88
557.59
450.15

0.97
0.96
0.89
0.90

643
438
53
56

1,424,417
1,019,743
110,333
22,279

0.01
0.03*
0.04*
0.09*

0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02

6,149.83
19,551.97
278.02
267.95

0.90
0.98
0.81
0.79

Measures of Internationalization
Depth of internationalization
Breadth (scope) of internationalization
Foreign subsidiaries
Internationalization dummy
Composite measure

259
170
33
54
65

743,494
281,546
47,048
295,269
114,256

0.06*
0.07*
-0.01
0.12*
0.07*

0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

7166.56
5284.87
227.28
1,928.42
898.16

0.96
0.97
0.86
0.97
0.93

545
298
63
97
96

906,640
462,436
68,921
530,677
65,635

0.01*
0.06*
-0.00
-0.02
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.01

8203.71
2359.66
233.55
12,660.20
876.96

0.93
0.87
0.74
0.99
0.89

Firm performance to firm performance
Internationalization to internationalization

262
242

372,861
221,079

0.33*
0.35*

0.02
0.02

32,345.31
25,937.70

0.99
0.99

Rhythm to firm performance
Speed to firm performance

5
12

7,487
3,450

-0.05
0.01

0.05
0.04

30.43
48.72

0.87
0.77

7
28

9,908
11,969

0.01
-0.04*

0.01
0.01

2.21
30.56

0.00
0.12

Mean = mean effect sizes marked with an asterisks (*) are statistically significant (p <0.05). k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; SE = the standard
error of mean correlation; Q = Cochran’s homogeneity test statistic; I2 = scale-free index of heterogeneity.

TABLE 1.2: MARA Meta-Analytic Results
Variable
Internationalization definition
Depth of Internationalization
Breadth (or Scope) of Internationalization
Internationalization dummy
Composite measure
Internationalization previous year

Coefficient Estimates
0.02 (0.01)*
0.05 (0.01)***
-0.01 (0.01)
0.03 (0.01)**
-0.03 (0.01)***

Firm performance definition
Accounting measures
Sales growth
Survey measures

-0.01 (0.01)
0.00 (0.01)
0.08 (0.02)***

Methodological artifacts
Published study
Median year of sample window
Panel design
Endogeneity check

0.02 (0.01)**
0.002 (0.00)***
0.00 (0.01)
-0.05 (0.01)***

Type of firms
Publicly listed firms
Private firms

-0.01 (0.00)
-0.03 (0.02)

Size of the firms
Large firms
SME firms

0.02 (0.01)***
0.02 (0.02)

Industries
Banking, finance & insurance sector
Chemical
Consultancy
High tech
Pharma & biotech

-0.04 (0.01)***
0.10 (0.03)***
-0.11 (0.03)***
-0.05 (0.02)***
-0.08 (0.02)***

Model specification artifacts
Industry controls
Year controls
Number of variables in regression
Multiple countries

0.01 (0.01)
-0.02 (0.01)*
-0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.01)

Firm controls†
Firm previous international experience
firm’s prior performance
Firm size
Firm age
R&D intensity
Advertising intensity

-0.02 (0.02)
0.02 (0.01)***
0.03 (0.01)***
-0.03 (0.01)***
-0.01 (0.01)
-0.01 (0.01)
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TABLE 1.2: MARA Meta-Analytic Results (continued)
Product diversification
Debt to equity level
Firm risk
Firm growth
Capital intensity

0.01 (0.01)
-0.01 (0.02)
-0.04 (0.01)***
0.04 (0.01)***
-0.01 (0.02)

Governance and TMT controls†
CEO/TMT international experience
Board independence
Ownership concentration
Inside ownership
Foreign ownership
Family ownership
Business group affiliation

-0.06 (0.03)*
0.04 (0.03)
-0.01 (0.02)
0.03 (0.02)
0.06 (0.02)**
0.03 (0.02)
0.00 (0.02)

Industry and country controls
Industry performance†
Host country potential†
Country distance†
Total GDP (home country) in billions

-0.01 (0.02)
0.02 (0.02)
-0.07 (0.03)***
-0.00 (0.00)*

Home country institutions
Generalized trust
Future orientation
Uncertainty avoidance
Common law tradition
Government business regulation
Political risk

0.001 (0.00)***
0.04 (0.02)*
-0.03 (0.01)***
-0.01 (0.02)
-0.001 (0.00)**
0.08 (0.02)***

K
Qmodel(p)
Qresidual(p)
V

1830
383.69 (0.00)
2547.75 (0.00)
0.01

The dependent variable is the I-P correlation in a given primary sample. Unstandardized regression
coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses. k is the number of samples; Q is the
homogeneity statistic with its probability in parentheses; v is the random effects variance component.
† indicates if a variable is included in a model (yes = 1) to test “omitted variable” bias.
*p < 0.10
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01
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TABLE 1.3: HOMA Country-Specific Meta-Analytic Results
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Country
Australia
Brazil
Canada
Mainland China
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
Kenya
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Pakistan
Russia
Singapore
Slovenia
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey

K
6
2
1
21
2
2
12
1
2
1
36
2
7
53

Pearson product-moment correlation (r)
N
Mean SE
Q test
I2
1,583
0.04
0.05
15.50
0.68
424
0.14* 0.05
0.09
0.00
167
0.09
395,257
0.01
0.02
145.28
0.86
434
0.35* 0.11
4.72
0.79
3,014
0.12
0.20
61.36
0.98
15,250
0.08* 0.03
104.99
0.90
763
0.06
162
-0.03 0.13
2.44
0.59
135
-0.02
121,983
0.06* 0.01
854.42
0.96
319
-0.03 0.12
1.73
0.42
3,549
0.01
0.05
52.06
0.88
200,140
0.01
0.02
3110.32
0.98

6
1
3
2

6,117
850
2,182
410

0.03
0.01
-0.07
-0.04

0.04

28.89

0.83

0.09
0.05

34.40
0.60

0.94
0.00

8
5
39
9
5
5
37

3,620
1,675
61,996
10,583
810
2,876
42,540

0.14*
0.15*
0.03*
0.08
0.09
0.06*
0.01

0.04
0.04
0.01
0.06
0.06
0.03
0.03

26.24
9.66
405.05
83.16
12.43
6.07
875.76

0.73
0.59
0.91
0.90
0.68
0.34
0.96

K

Partial linear correlation coefficient (rxy.z)
N
Mean
SE
Q test

I2

4
44
40

2,900
11,169
418,253

0.09*
0.01
0.05*

0.02
0.02
0.01

1.50
147.16
417.43

0.00
0.71
0.91

12
40
3

7,856
49,764
2,289

0.09*
-0.02
0.21*

0.03
0.03
0.07

67.84
1807.76
22.14

0.84
0.98
0.91

61
3
26
57
2
9
7
12
5
1
13
4
5
40
1
10
1
35
16

158,910
873
27,204
71,163
108
8,084
4,722
10,525
866
826
42,835
1,993
1,675
88,030
374
2,676
696
37,737
3,200

0.00
-0.00
0.05*
-0.02
-0.29*
-0.07
-0.04*
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.02*
0.10*
0.07*
0.01*
0.03
0.09*
0.11
0.00
0.01

0.01
0.05
0.01
0.04
0.12
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.03

319.76
3.67
20.37
6977.19
1.42
82.93
7.00
65.14
0.09

0.81
0.46
0.00
0.99
0.30
0.90
0.14
0.83
0.00

0.00
0.04
0.02
0.01

6.24
9.61
1.69
96.24

0.00
0.69
0.00
0.59

0.02

6.23

0.00

0.02
0.02

300.51
7.64

0.89
0.00

TABLE 1.3: HOMA Country-Specific Meta-Analytic Results (continued)
UK
Uruguay
US
Multiple

17

25,899

0.11*

0.04

611.84

0.97

209
146

466,263
189,454

0.09*
0.07*

0.01
0.01

3338.00
3809.05

0.94
0.96

42
1
322
374

38,006
291
922,784
660,963

0.06*
0.18
0.01
0.03*

0.01

140.19

0.71

0.01
0.00

9779.86
3922.67

0.97
0.90

Mean = mean effect sizes marked with an asterisk (*) are statistically significant (p <0.05). k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; SE = the
standard error of mean correlation; Q = Cochran’s homogeneity test statistic; I2 = scale-free index of heterogeneity.
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TABLE 1.4: Meta-Analyses on the I-P Relationship
Our meta-analysis
No. of primary studies
Data sources
No. of effect sizes
Time window
No. of industries
No. of countries
I-P relationship

Bausch & Krist
(2007)
36
Pearson’s r

75

359
Pearson’s r and
partial correlation
rxy.z
640 (r) and 1,190
146
(rxy.z)
1972-2012
1979-2004
5
n.a.
32
n.a.
r-based mean: 0.06 r-based mean:
(sig.)
0.059 (sig.)
rxy-based mean:
0.02 (sig.)
Non-linear
relationship: n.s.

Kirca et al. (2011)
111
Pearson’s r

Kirca et al.
(2012a)
141
Pearson’s r

346

416

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
17
n.a.
r-based mean: 0.10 Does not test the
(sig.)
direct I-P
relationship, but
the moderation
effect of different
operationalizations
of I on P (i.e.,
dummy variable
for depth (vs.
breadth) of I: (sig.))

Ruigrok & Wagner Yang & Driffield
(2004)
(2012)
62
54
Pearson’s r
β coefficients
174
n.a.
n.a.
12
r-based mean: 0.04
(sig.)
Non-linear
relationship: n.s.

370

1962-2004
n.a.
21
Does not test the
direct I-P
relationship, but
moderation effect
of different
operationalizations
of I on P (i.e.,
dummy variable
for non-FSTS
measures of I: (both sig. and
n.s.))
Institutional moderators Country of origin Country of origin: Dummy variables Dummy variable Country of origin: Dummy variable
of the I-P relationship
effect
for advanced
USA + (sig.);
for non-US firms:
USA + (sig.);
for: Firms from
(32 countries): sig. Europe + (sig.);
economies: + (sig.) Europe + (sig.);
+ (sig.)
developing
(see Table 1.3)
economies with
and Japan (n.s.)
and Japan (n.s.)
Formal
high advertising
institutions:
intensity (n.s.);
Common law: n.s.;
Developing
Government
economies with
business
high R&D
regulations: intensity: + (sig.);
(sig.);
Advanced

TABLE 1.4: Meta-Analyses on the I-P Relationship (continued)

Moderation effect of
industries on the I-P
relationship
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Moderation effect of
different
operationalizations of IV
(I) and DV (P)

Political risk: +
(sig.)
Informal
institutions:
Generalized trust:
+ (sig.);
Future orientation:
+ (sig.);
Uncertainty
avoidance: - (sig.)
Yes (banking,
finance and
insurance;
chemical;
consultancy; high
tech; pharma and
biotech)
Yes

economy firms
with high
advertising
intensity: + (sig.);
Advanced
economies with
high R&D
intensity: + (sig.)
Not Tested

Yes

Yes
Yes
(manufacturing vs. (manufacturing vs.
service, high tech
service)
vs. low tech)

Not Tested

Yes

Not Tested

Not Tested

Yes

Yes

45
40
35
30
25
20

Unpublished

15

Published

10
5
0
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FIGURE 1.1: Distribution of Papers over Time
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FIGURE 1.2: Funnel Plot
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ESSAY 2

INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION: A META-ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION
Business landscapes are increasingly global. Over the last quarter of a century, world FDI
outward stock has dramatically increased (from 2,254 billion of dollars in 1990 to 25,875
in 2014) and country investment policy measures around the world have been geared to
promote cross-border investment to an ever-larger extent (UNCTAD, 2015). In this
scenario, constantly advancing our understanding of the implications of firms’
international diversification is a paramount objective for both scholars and practitioners.
Equally important is the investigation of the factors potentially affecting cross-border
investment decisions, given the complex competitive and economic cost-benefit trade-off
characterizing international diversification. Indeed, the determinants and consequences of
firms’ international diversification have drawn significant attention in the strategy and
international business literatures (see Hitt et al., 2006 for a comprehensive review).
Research has investigated antecedents at the individual, group, firm, industry, and
country level of analysis (see Kirca et al., 2012 for a meta-analysis of those antecedents),
as well as outcomes at the firm (e.g., Reeb et al., 1998; Zahra et al. 2000) and country
level of analysis (e.g., Alfaro et al. 2006; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Spencer, 2008). In this
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paper, we focus on the complex, bidirectional relationship between corporate governance
and firms’ international diversification.
Anecdotal evidence in international business suggests that corporate governance
may affect the extent of international diversification. For example, since the 1990s,
Volkswagen Group has pursued an aggressive foreign expansion, consistent with the
publicly-announced goal of being the world’s largest automaker by sales (The New York
Times, 2015). However, as an analyst put it, “VW was an organization full of hubris, […]
dominate the world and walk-on-water type of thinking” (Financial Times, 2016),
suggesting that the aggressive international growth, whose side effects included the highprofile violation of US environmental regulations, may not have necessarily been in the
interest of minority shareholders and the society at large. Volkswagen’s corporate
governance framework may have played an important role in the Group’s
internationalization process. First, growth was a key criterion to which executive
compensation was linked, resulting in a strong economic incentive to increase the size of
the Group’s foreign footprint (Armour, 2016). Second, as pointed out by several experts,
corporate governance practices at Volkswagen had “long been uniquely awful” (CNBC,
2015). In particular, the lack of independence in the supervisory board (Financial Times,
2015) exacerbated the effect of the incentives created by the executive compensation
structure. Since growth was “an ambition that pleased both stakeholder groups
dominating the Aufsichtsrat, the controlling shareholders and the employees” (Armour,
2016), the board closely monitored growth performance (The New York Times, 2015).
When focusing on corporate governance and the degree of international
diversification, there is however the other side of the story. For example, after criticism
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by U.S. institutional investors about its corporate governance framework, Samsung
Group recently announced its plan to split the roles of CEO and chairman of the board at
eight of its companies (e.g., Wall Street Journal, 2016). This move represents a step
further in “bringing the company into alignment with global practices” (Wall Street
Journal, 2016).
From a theoretical point of view, corporate governance scholars suggest that
governance mechanisms may affect the extent of firms’ international diversification (e.g.,
Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). By contrast, the international management literature
suggests that expansion abroad, through multiple theoretical mechanisms, may trigger
changes in firms’ corporate governance framework (e.g., Kostova et al., 2008; Sanders &
Carpenter, 1998). The literature, indeed, provides evidence for both causality directions.
For example, research corroborates the argument that firms’ degree of international
diversification both affects (e.g., Le et al., 2013) and is affected (e.g., Tihanyi et al.,
2009) by the level of contingent executive pay. Similarly, some scholars show that the
extent of foreign expansion has an effect on the proportion of outside directors (e.g.,
Tihanyi et al., 2003), while others provide evidence that board independence impacts
export propensity (e.g., Lu et al., 2009). Likewise, the literature, on the one hand, shows
that board size influences the firm’s degree of international diversification (e.g., Lien et
al., 2005) and, on the other hand, provides empirical support for the opposite causality
direction―from firms’ degree of foreign expansion to board size (e.g., Sanders &
Carpenter, 1998). Besides the direction of causality, the sign of the relationship between
corporate governance and firms’ international diversification also receives mixed
empirical evidence. Some scholars report a positive correlation between the level of
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ownership concentration and the extent of international diversification (e.g., Alessandri &
Seth, 2014), while others provide evidence for a negative correlation (e.g., Hautz et al.,
2013). Similarly, research shows both a positive (e.g., Zahra, 2003) and a negative (e.g.,
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) correlation between CEO duality and the degree of foreign
expansion.
Extant research therefore, from both a theoretical and empirical perspective, does
not provide definitive answer as to the nature (i.e., direction, magnitude, and sign) of the
corporate governance-international diversification (CG-ID) relationship. Moreover,
extant research is somewhat lacking in the exploration of the theoretical mechanisms
linking corporate governance and international diversification (e.g., Filatotchev &
Wright, 2011). In order to have more impactful research on the CG-ID relationship, it is
critical to develop a more fine-grained understanding of which mechanisms are at play
and how they operate. Hence, there is an opportunity for further research, which may
advance our comprehension of such business phenomena as those mentioned above, and
push forward the existing theoretical knowledge about the CG-ID relationship. Drawing
on the corporate governance and international diversification literatures, we attempt to
shed new light on such relationship in two major ways. First, we investigate each
direction of causality and the theoretical mechanisms at play. Second, we examine the
relative explanatory power of the two alternative cause-effect linkages between corporate
governance and international diversification. Given the characteristics of our data and
method, we believe that our twofold attempt represents also a constructive step in dealing
with potential scientific apophenia (i.e., the tendency to find evidence of order where
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none exists) in the CG-ID research area (e.g., Goldfarb & King, 2016; Harrison et al.,
2014).
Agency theory and the resource perspective are the two primary theoretical lenses
of this study. These perspectives are theoretically relevant when exploring the causal
linkages between corporate governance and international diversification. Corporate
governance is strictly related to the intensity of the agency problem (e.g., Fama & Jensen,
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997): A key reason for adopting
certain corporate governance practices is the attempt by firms’ decision makers to contain
the detrimental consequences of agency conflicts between owners and managers.
International diversification is subject to agency problems for at least three reasons. First,
internationalization decisions may entail a cost–benefit trade-off for managers and
owners in terms of organizational outcomes. This is due to the fact that different risk
preferences may lead to different objectives pursued by those who own and those who
control the firm (e.g., Filatotchev & Wright, 2001). Second, internationalization decisions
are characterized by low frequency and long duration, which make even more
pronounced the aforementioned trade-off (e.g., Michael & Pearce, 2004). Third,
international diversification aggravates information asymmetries between managers and
owners, since it increases the external and internal complexity confronting the firm (e.g.,
Roth & O’Donnell, 1996; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). External complexity refers to the
heterogeneity of the task environments (e.g., Child 1972; Dess & Beard, 1984), as well as
to the variety of institutional prescriptions faced by the firm (e.g., Greenwood et al.,
2011; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Internal complexity refers to the organizational
implications, in terms of structure, mechanisms, and culture, of external complexity (e.g.,
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Ashby, 1956; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Thompson, 1967). By exacerbating the external and
internal complexity that firms need to deal with, international diversification also
increases the information-processing demands confronting them (e.g., Sanders &
Carpenter, 1998). This implies, inter alia, that “information-processing demands […] and
agency concerns […] are at least partially isomorphic throughout an organization”
(Sanders & Carpenter, 1998: 161). Therefore, when developing some of our hypotheses,
we complement the agency theory perspective with the information-processing
perspective.
The resource perspective is particularly relevant for exploring the CG-ID
relationship for at least two reasons. First, corporate governance mechanisms may favor
the acquisition of organizational and managerial resources and capabilities instrumental
in firms’ internationalization process. Second, international diversification implies
exposure to different institutional environments, both at the national level and the
transnational meta-level (Kostova et al., 2008). As a result, the firm may develop
awareness of alternative practices in multiple domains, including corporate governance,
and learn how to implement and integrate those practices within the organizational
framework (e.g., Marano et al., 2016). Based on these two perspectives, we predict that
corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem and those providing
better access to organizational and managerial resources have a positive effect on the
firm’s degree of international diversification. Moreover, we predict that the firm’s degree
of international diversification positively influences the activation of corporate
governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem and/or increasing the
information-processing capacity of the firm.
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International management research suggests that depth and breadth of
international diversification represent two different (though not orthogonal) dimensions
of firms’ foreign footprint (e.g., Hitt et al., 2006; Thomas & Eden, 2004), which are
characterized by peculiar theoretical implications in terms, for example, of knowledge
requirements, resource access and development, economies along the value chain, and
risk mitigation. We suggest that distinguishing between the two dimensions may be
particularly relevant in the context of the CG-ID relationship. First, the risk preferences
of managers may entail different attitudes towards the larger extent of operations abroad
associated with higher depth from the greater diversity resulting from higher breadth.
Second, depth and breadth seem to have different implications in terms of complexity to
cope with, which in turn affect the agency and resource issues confronted by the firm.
Failing to unpack international diversification into depth and breadth may leave an
important part of the story untold, as depth and breadth may affect and be affected
differently by corporate governance. Therefore, we also explore whether and how the
direction, magnitude, and sign of the CG-ID relationship changes when considering depth
and breadth of international diversification.
An additional step to advance our understanding of the CG-ID relationship is the
examination of contingencies that may affect the relationship. Indeed, little is understood
about potential moderators altering the causal connections between corporate governance
and size of foreign footprint. In this study, we focus on two contingencies at the country
level that may moderate the CG-ID relationship: the institutional characteristic of legal
protection of minority shareholders and the cultural value of uncertainty avoidance.
Research in international finance and international management shows that the legal
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protection of shareholders varies across countries (e.g., Djankov et al., 2008; Guillen &
Capron, 2016; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). When studying the CG-ID relationship, the
legal protection of shareholders is relevant for at least two reasons. First, the relative
impact of (soft) corporate governance mechanisms on international diversification
decisions may change, depending on whether the country institutional context contributes
to curtail or compound agency problems (e.g., Capron & Guillen, 2009). Second, firms
from countries with lower shareholder protection may be particularly eager to adapt to
transnational pressures for ‘good’ corporate governance when expanding abroad (e.g.,
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). When exploring the CG-ID relationship, uncertainty avoidance
may be another consequential contingency. Given the performance uncertainty associated
with the strategic decision to expand into foreign countries, the influence of corporate
governance on international diversification may vary across countries characterized by
different levels of uncertainty avoidance.
The research questions addressed in this study are, therefore, the following:
1) What is the direction, magnitude, and sign of the causal relationship between
corporate governance and international diversification?
2) What are the theoretical mechanisms at play in the CG-ID relationship?
3) Do direction, magnitude, and sign of the causal relationship change when
distinguishing between depth and breadth of international diversification?
4) Does the home-country institutional context affect the CG-ID relationship?
Specifically, do the legal protection of minority shareholders and the national uncertainty
avoidance moderate the causal effects between corporate governance and international
diversification?
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In order to address our research questions, we use meta-analytic structural
equation modeling (MASEM) with data from 104 studies conducted in the management,
economics, and finance disciplines over the last two decades. As Bergh and his
colleagues (2016) point out, MASEM offers significant advantages for advancing
existing research. First, MASEM allows us to build on the extant body of empirical
research testing the CG-ID relationship in order to assess: 1) the direct effects model
linking corporate governance to the degree of international diversification; and 2) the
direct effects model linking the degree of international diversification to corporate
governance. Unlike MASEM, traditional meta-analysis cannot be used to test competing
models against one another; it can only be employed to test the sign and significance of
the bivariate relationships of interest. MASEM represents a more powerful technique
than traditional meta-analysis, providing the opportunity to draw on the accumulated
findings to pit alternative complex models (Bergh et al., 2016). Second, previous research
on the CG-ID relationship has usually focused on individual mechanisms of firms’
corporate governance framework (ownership structure, board structure, etc.). Unlike
other meta-analytic techniques, MASEM allows us to shed light on the role played by
each governance mechanisms while accounting for interdependencies with other
mechanisms. As shown in the literature, corporate governance mechanisms are not
independent, being related to one another by forms of complementarity and
substitutability (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2008). Third, MASEM allows us to provide new
insights on the CG-ID relationship also by testing novel theory-developing hypotheses
focused on country-level contingencies potentially moderating the main relationship.
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Four main findings emerge from our study. First, the causal relationship between
corporate governance and international diversification is bidirectional and multifaceted in
nature. Second, corporate governance explains the degree of international diversification
better than international diversification explains the activation of corporate governance
mechanisms. Third, the nature of the causal linkages between corporate governance and
international diversification changes depending on whether the focus is on the depth or
breadth of foreign expansion. Fourth, both directions of causality in the CG-ID
relationship are moderated by the home-country institutional context and, in particular,
by the legal shareholder protection and the national uncertainty avoidance.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we develop our model by discussing
from a theoretical perspective the influence of corporate governance on the degree of
international diversification as well as the effects of international diversification on the
activation of corporate governance mechanisms. Next, we explain the meta-analytic
methodology employed (i.e., MASEM), the data, and the results. Finally, we conclude
with a discussion of our results and promising avenues for future research on the CG-ID
relationship.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT
In order to develop our theoretical arguments, we draw on the corporate governance and
international management literatures and adopt primarily the agency theory and resource
perspectives. Given our focus on the CG-ID relationship, the two main theoretical
constructs explored in this study are corporate governance and international
diversification. From a managerial perspective, corporate governance is defined as the set
of “formal structures, informal structures, and processes that exist in oversight roles and
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responsibilities in the corporate context” (Hambrick, et al. 2008, p. 381; see also Aguilera
et al., 2015). Herein, we focus on the following corporate governance mechanisms:
ownership concentration, institutional ownership, board independence, board size,
separation of CEO and chairman roles, inside ownership, CEO compensation, and CEO
tenure. International diversification is defined as the size of a firm’s foreign operations
(e.g., Hennart, 2011). Depth of international diversification refers to the extent to which a
firm relies on its foreign operations, while breadth refers to the geographic scope of a
firm’s foreign footprint (e.g., George et al., 2005).
Effects of corporate governance on the degree of international diversification
Effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the degree of international
diversification may be explained by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt,
1989) and the resource perspective on corporate governance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
Corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem. The
overarching prediction of an agency theory perspective on the CG-ID relationship posits
that a reduction of agency problems by means of appropriate corporate governance
mechanisms has a positive effect on the degree of international diversification.
International diversification is characterized by unusual uncertainty about performance
outcomes (e.g., Hymer, 1960; Zaheer, 1995). The strategic nature of international
diversification turns that uncertainty into significant risks for firms, since this strategy
implies long-term commitment to a certain path that is potentially costly to reverse
(Caves, 1984; Ghemawat, 1991). The principal-agent perspective, hence, suggests that
managers’ risk aversion may limit the extent of firms’ expansion abroad (e.g., Lien et al.
2005; Filatotchev et al. 2008). By doing so, managers pursue higher job security and
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more certain rewards (Ellstrand et al., 2002), albeit shareholders likely prefer courses of
actions that maximize returns, even when accompanied by higher risk (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). By curbing the agency problem and thus restraining the effects of
managers’ risk aversion, such corporate governance mechanisms as ownership
concentration (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), institutional ownership (e.g., Tihanyi et al.,
2003), board independence (e.g., Bhagat & Black, 2002), separation of CEO and
chairman roles (e.g., Rechner & Dalton, 1991), inside ownership (e.g., Jensen & Murphy,
1990), and CEO compensation (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997) may favor a
higher degree of international diversification.
Research based on agency theory points out that some of these corporate
governance mechanisms lower the intensity of the agency problem by increasing the
monitoring of managerial behavior (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). First, ownership
concentration may reduce the extent of self-serving behavior by mangers, who may
attempt to avoid the risks rather than pursue the potential long-term opportunities
associated with expansion abroad (Bolton & von Thadden, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny,
1986). Ownership concentration may be an effective governance mechanism closing the
gap between ownership and control, thus having important implications for
internationalization decisions. Concentrated ownership reduces the information
asymmetries between owners and managers and, as a result, increase owners’ ability to
monitor and control managers. Furthermore, concentrated ownership increases owners’
stake in the firm. Large and often undiversified owners have a greater incentive to
monitor and control mangers, in order to limit the self-serving actions affecting the
pursuit of organizational goals. Finally, concentrated ownership provides owners with the
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means to restrain managerial opportunism, as they have the power to dismiss managers
based on their performance. In sum, by increasing ability, incentive, and power to
monitor and control managers, ownership concentration may offset managerial riskaversion and encourage the search of economic opportunities abroad.
Second, from an agency theory perspective, institutional ownership may also
favor firms’ expansion abroad. Institutional investors have the incentive to encourage
investees’ international diversification because they generally have and aim to maintain
globally diversified, low-risk portfolios (e.g., Lien et al., 2005; Singh & Gaur, 2013).
Moreover, institutional investors are often pressure-resistant investors, who do not have
strong business connections with their investee firms (e.g., David et al., 1998; Tihanyi et
al., 2003). This gives them the freedom to promote the adoption of corporate governance
best practices (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2002; Lien et al., 2005). Further, institutional
investors are usually endowed with superior monitoring abilities, which they employ to
scrutinize firms’ strategic decision-making process (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2007). As a
result, institutional ownership may reduce the agency problems associated with
managerial discretion. This implies, inter alia, a positive effect on managerial risk-taking
and, thus, on investees’ degree of international diversification.
Third, arguments based on agency theory commonly posit that outside and, in
particular, independent directors play an important role in monitoring and controlling
managerial actions (Bhagat & Black, 2002). Such monitoring role may prevent riskaverse managers from forgoing the economic opportunities associated with international
diversification. Extant corporate governance research shows that the number of inside
directors sitting on the board is negatively associated with the level of political risk
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present in a firm’s portfolio of foreign investments (Ellstrand et al., 2002). The
theoretical argument explaining this negative association is that inside directors, being
part of the top management team, tend to favor strategic alternatives that meet their risk
preferences. By contrast, outside and, in particular, independent directors can properly
exercise their monitoring function over managerial behavior, given the absence of any
kind of connections with the firm and its executive team. Therefore, by extending this
line of research, one may reasonably expect that the number of outside and, in particular,
independent directors may positively affect the degree of international diversification as
well.
Fourth, according to a principal-agent perspective, CEO duality weakens the
monitoring process within firms’ corporate governance framework. CEOs that are also
chairmen of the board are in a stronger position to control the strategic decision-making
process (Boyd, 1995; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). As a result, they tend to promote
cautious courses of action to protect their position. Empirical evidence shows that CEO
duality is negatively related to the level of political risk of firms’ investments abroad
(Ellstrand et al., 2002). Similarly, one may predict that CEO duality has a negative effect
on the degree of international diversification or, equivalently, the separation of CEO and
chairman roles positively influences the extent of expansion abroad.
Research based on agency theory points out that, in addition to those concerning
monitoring, mechanisms focused on interest alignment may decrease the intensity of the
agency problem (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). First, inside ownership aligns the risk
preferences and interests of the managers with those of the owners, as long-term firm
performance becomes a primary factor determining their wealth. Research shows that
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such alignment enhances managers’ propensity to export (Lu et al., 2009) as well as to
opt for a riskier entry mode (i.e., acquisition) when investing in a certain host country
(Lai et al., 2012). This logic suggests, hence, that alignment of interests may reduce the
self-serving risk aversion of managers and prompt the pursuit of the advantages
associated with expansion abroad, thus increasing the degree of international
diversification of the firm.
Second, the level of total CEO compensation may help overcome the agency
problem resulting from managerial risk aversion. By resorting to higher remuneration,
firms may attempt to compensate CEOs in advance for the risks associated with
expansion abroad. Therefore, one may expect that higher CEO compensation will result
in a higher degree of international diversification.
The above arguments, based on agency theory, lead to the following general
causal prediction:
Hypothesis 1: Corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem
positively affect the degree of international diversification.
Specifically, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 1a: Ownership concentration positively affects the degree of
international diversification.
Hypothesis 1b: Institutional ownership positively affects the degree of
international diversification.
Hypothesis 1c: Board independence positively affects the degree of international
diversification.
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Hypothesis 1d: The separation of CEO and chairman positions positively affects
the degree of international diversification.
Hypothesis 1e: Inside ownership positively affects the degree of international
diversification.
Hypothesis 1f: The level of CEO compensation positively affects the degree of
international diversification.
Corporate governance mechanisms providing better access to organizational
and managerial resources. Besides agency theory, the resource perspective on corporate
governance helps explain the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the
degree of international diversification. The overarching prediction of a resource
perspective on the CG-ID relationship posits that a better access to organizational and
managerial resources by means of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms has a
positive effect on the degree of international diversification. Research points out that
corporate governance mechanisms may not only play monitoring and control functions,
but also contribute to the decision-making process. For example, corporate governance
may support firms in a number of complex strategic processes (e.g., product and
international diversification, M&As, turnarounds) by facilitating firms’ access to
organizational and managerial resources such as international experience, industry
expertise, functional skills, and professional networks (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2001;
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). This means that corporate governance mechanisms may
change top executives’ attitude about internationalization and increase their propensity to
undertake foreign direct investments. First, board size is a mechanism that may favor
higher degrees of international diversification, since it expands the amount and diversity
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of the human and relational capital available for the strategic decision-making process
(e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2008; Lien et al., 2005; Lu et al., 2009). Second, longer tenure
may better equip CEOs to cope with the challenges of such a resource-intensive and risky
move as international diversification (e.g., Kirca et al., 2012). Even though longer tenure
results in greater managerial discretion, which makes monitoring more difficult (e.g.,
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick et al., 1993), long-tenured CEOs may be more
willing to expand abroad because, over time, they have developed greater managerial
skills and acquired deeper knowledge of the firm and its industry (e.g., Hambrick &
Fukutomi, 1991; Kirca et al., 2012).
The above arguments, based on the resource perspective, lead to the following
general causal prediction:
Hypothesis 2: Corporate governance mechanisms providing better access to
organizational and managerial resources positively affect the degree of
international diversification.
Specifically, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 2a: Board size positively affects the degree of international
diversification.
Hypothesis 2b: CEO tenure positively affects the degree of international
diversification.
Figure 2.1 offers a representation of our theoretical model linking corporate
governance to the degree of international diversification.
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Effects of the degree of international diversification on corporate governance
Effects of the degree of international diversification on corporate governance are
predicted by agency theory (e.g., Jensen & Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989),
information-processing theory (e.g., Daft & Lengel, 1986; Galbraith, 1974; Thompson,
1967), and the institution-based resource perspective (e.g., Kostova et al., 2008; Marano
& Kostova, 2016).
Agency theory perspective on the effects of international diversification. As
discussed earlier, agency theory helps explain the effects of corporate governance
mechanisms on the degree of international diversification. However, it also explains the
opposite causality direction (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). The overarching
prediction of an agency theory perspective on the ID-CG relationship posits that the
degree of international diversification, by affecting the intensity of the agency problem,
will be positively related to the use of certain corporate governance mechanisms.
Scholars have pointed out that agency problems tend to exacerbate when the complexity
confronting the firm increases (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Roth &
O’Donnell, 1996). Higher firm complexity aggravates information asymmetries between
managers and owners, since it requires more specialized knowledge about the firm and its
task environment that will likely be available to managers, but not to owners (e.g.,
Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Roth & O’Donnell, 1996). Moreover, firm complexity is
usually associated with a larger number of decision options and more ambiguous causal
relationships (e.g., Roth & O’Donnell, 1996). As a result, managerial discretion increases
and monitoring managerial behavior becomes more difficult (e.g., Hambrick &
Finkelstein, 1987; Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 1992). By increasing firm complexity,
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international diversification aggravates the principal-agent conflict, thus prompting the
use of corporate governance mechanisms that strengthen the monitoring of managerial
behavior as well as the alignment of interests between owners and managers (e.g.,
Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). First, when increasing their degree of international
diversification, firms may resort to higher board independence (e.g., Luo, 2005). As
noted above, corporate governance scholars commonly argue that outside and, in
particular, independent directors play an important role in monitoring and controlling
managerial actions (Bhagat & Black, 2002). Second, greater expansion abroad may result
in larger inside ownership, which aligns―as we previously noted―the risk preferences
and interests of the managers with those of the owners.
Information-processing perspective on the effects of international
diversification. Strictly related to the agency theory perspective on the ID-CG
relationship is the information-processing perspective. The overarching prediction of an
information-processing perspective on the ID-CG relationship posits that the increase in
information-processing demands resulting from a higher degree of international
diversification will (contribute to) activate some corporate governance
mechanisms―which we term here information-processing enablers. Management
scholars adopting an information-processing perspective view firms as open social
systems that need to deal with complexity by collecting and processing relevant
information (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). The
information-processing demands confronting top executives are therefore determined by
the level of complexity that the firm needs to cope with (e.g., Daft & Lengel, 1986;
Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). Such complexity is affected by a number of factors,
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including the degree of international diversification (e.g., Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Roth
& O’Donnell, 1996; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). First, international diversification is
often a strategic implication of product diversification (e.g., Denis et al., 2002) and
vertical integration (e.g., Teece, 1981, 1985), both of which are positively related to
firms’ internal complexity (e.g., Chandler, 1962; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996).
Second, the decision to expand internationally implies that firms may need to cope with
potentially unfamiliar host country environments, limited relevant knowledge, and the
effects of cultural, administrative, geographic, and economic distance between home and
host countries (Eden & Miller, 2001; Ghemawat, 2001; Kostova, 1999). Put differently,
firms’ liability of foreignness may result in less effective business decisions than those
made by local firms (Hymer, 1960; Mezias, 2002; Zaheer, 1995). The complexity
ensuing from the liability of foreignness intensifies along with increases in the degree of
international diversification, since the volume and diversity of external environmental
stimuli expand (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Third, the internationally diversified
firms need to manage (effectively) the strategic interdependence among their subunits.
When adopting a global or transnational strategy, a significant degree of interdependence
exists among the subunits (Kostova & Roth, 2003). Even when internationally diversified
firms do not derive their benefits from an integrated and standardized approach (i.e.,
when adopting a multinational strategy), there still is a certain amount of interdependence
among the subunits, due to such factors as visibility and legitimacy spillovers (Kostova &
Zaheer, 1999). Fourth, as a result of subunit interdependence, internationally diversified
firms need to continuously handle the internal tensions and conflicts arising whenever
inter-unit boundaries are crossed in everyday activities. Indeed, those boundaries
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represent the loci where “‘localized’ contestations are likely to erupt, because the units
[…] are guided by a different set of goals, practices, and priorities” (Raynard, 2014: 13).
By increasing firm complexity and thus the information-processing demands,
international diversification may contribute to activate the corporate governance
mechanisms that enable information processing within the firm (e.g., Oxelheim et al.
2013; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). First, larger boards may expand the overall
information-processing capacity of the firm, due to the higher number of members
composing them (e.g., Luo, 2005; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Hence, board size may be
expected to grow as the firm increases the size of its foreign footprint. Second, longer
tenure in the firm provides CEOs with greater knowledge of the firm and its task
environment (e.g., Herrmann & Datta, 2006), making them more equipped to confront
the information-processing demands resulting from international expansion. Thus, from
an information-processing perspective, CEO tenure may be positively related to the
degree of international diversification. Third, corporate governance research has shown
that the volume of information-processing demands positively affects the level of CEO
compensation, since information-processing is a critical task for firm survival and success
and the ability to process a larger and more complex amount of information is likely to be
a scarce and valuable skill (e.g., Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). This implies that a
greater degree of international diversification is positively associated with a higher level
of CEO pay (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Fourth, the separation of CEO and
chairman positions may increase the information-processing capacity, by spreading
power and expanding the number of people involved in the strategic decision-making
process (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). By increasing the information-processing
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demands for the firm, the degree of international diversification is therefore expected to
increase the likelihood that CEO and chairman positions are separated.
When investigating the ID-CG relationship, the agency theory and informationprocessing perspectives stress deliberate responses by firms to the complexity associated
with larger foreign footprints. In particular, those perspectives point out the intentional
actions that firms take in order to shape their corporate governance framework during or
after the internationalization process. This implies that those actions focus on corporate
governance mechanisms that can be controlled by the firm. Though not fully under the
control of the firm, ownership concentration and institutional ownership may
nevertheless be affected by the degree of international diversification. Institutional
investors generally have and aim to maintain globally diversified, low-risk portfolios
(e.g., Lien et al., 2005; Singh & Gaur, 2013). Consequently, as the firm expands its
presence abroad, its attractiveness to institutional investors increases; in turn, greater
attractiveness will result in higher institutional ownership and, hence, lower ownership
concentration (e.g., Luo, 2005). Furthermore, institutional ownership represents another
theoretical mechanism through which international diversification influences the adoption
of corporate governance practices addressing principal-agent conflicts. Institutional
owners are characterized by dual identity (Pratt & Foreman, 2000), since they are
principals also serving as agents for those providing them the funds to invest (Arthurs et
al., 2008; Hoskisson et al., 2013). Such dual identity is a primary driver of shareholder
activism, since it prompts institutional owners to be more effective monitors of investees’
executives in order to protect the interests of their principals (e.g., Useem, 1996). For
example, Samsung Group’s decision to separate the CEO and chairman positions at eight
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of its companies was the “latest attempt to bolster its corporate governance in the wake of
shareholder criticism” (Wall Street Journal, 2016).
Resource perspective on the effects of international diversification. When the
degree of international diversification increases, another mechanism affects the adoption
of corporate governance practices curtailing the principal-agent conflict. International
diversification implies greater exposure to alternative organizational practices in a variety
of domains (e.g., corporate governance, labor relations, corporate social responsibility,
human resource management, finance, firm-government relations). Such practices may be
institutionalized either in the host countries where the firm operates or in the
transnational meta-institutional field (e.g., Kostova et al., 2008). Kostova and her
colleagues argue that the transnational meta-institutional field is “very broad and narrow
at the same time. It is broad in the sense that it encompasses MNCs in general, but it is
narrow with regard to the number and scope of institutionalized values and practices that
it enforces” (2008: 998). In a limited number of domains, including principal-agent
conflicts, internationally diversified firms confront expectations and requirements that are
transnational in nature. When internationally diversified firms fail to meet those
expectations and requirements, negative legitimacy spillovers across the metainstitutional field may significantly harm their operations in multiple countries (e.g.,
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Certain corporate governance practices addressing the
principal-agent conflict have gone through a transnational institutionalization process
over the last quarter of a century. This is reflected, for instance, in the spread around the
world of codes of good governance that in most of the cases include some universal
recommendations based on agency theory (e.g., Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009;
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Cuomo et al., 2016). Hence, internationally diversified firms may adopt those
institutionalized corporate governance practices in order to establish or maintain
legitimacy in the meta-institutional field and avoid the sanctions resulting from deviant
behavior (e.g., Kostova et al., 2008). It is worth emphasizing that pressures from the
meta-institutional field may result in the implementation of certain corporate governance
practices, but not necessarily in their internalization (e.g., Kostova & Roth, 2002). For
example, when Samsung Group announced the split of the CEO and chairman positions
of the board at eight of its companies, a research analyst with expertise in South Korean
boards described the move as “a symbolic change” (The Wall Street Journal, 2016). This
allows us to emphasize that, while our focus is on corporate governance practices
addressing the principal-agent conflict, the agency theory and institution-based resource
perspectives do not necessarily suggest the same degree of adoption of those practices.
The institutionalization process of corporate governance practices addressing the
agency problem originated and enhanced in Western developed countries (e.g., Aguilera
& Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). However, as the aforementioned example about Samsung and
CEO duality illustrates, the relevance of those practices is global by now, meaning that
expectations in the meta-institutional field concern firms from both developed and
developing countries. First, since the late 1990s, transnational organizations, such as the
ICGN and the OECD, created codes in order to improve corporate governance practices
around the world; moreover, the World Bank actively engaged in the promotion of good
governance in multiple countries (e.g., Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Cuomo et al.,
2016). Second, during the same period, an increasing number of developing countries has
developed corporate governance codes (e.g., Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Cuomo
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et al., 2016). Third, privatization in many developing countries has resulted in corporate
governance changes within newly-privatized firms: on the one hand, the adoption of
corporate governance practices reducing agency problems has been an important factor
contributing to the attraction of foreign capital and, on the other hand, foreign
shareholders have pushed for corporate governance changes in order to protect their
interests (e.g., Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Guedhami et al., 2009). Fourth, firms from
developing countries are increasingly more internationally diversified (UNCTAD, 2015).
Marano and her colleagues argue that higher international diversification favors the
development of “organizational identities as global actors in meta-institutional fields” and
this should make them “more attentive to meta-institutional pressures and more receptive
to adopting legitimate global practices” (2016b: 6).
The above arguments point out the relevance of the institution-based resource
perspective when examining the ID-CG relationship. By exposing the firm to alternative
corporate governance practices, international diversification provides opportunities for
learning (e.g., Baum et al., 2000). The meta-institutional field ‘constrains’ firms to adopt
certain corporate governance practices in order to maintain legitimacy. However, by
doing so, it also ‘enables’ firms to experience different practices and, thus, to develop
knowledge concerning their implementation and integration within the organization (e.g.,
Marano & Kostova, 2016). This enabling effect does not involve institutional agency and
institutional change (e.g., Saka-Helmhout & Geppert, 2011; Seo & Creed, 2002); rather,
it concerns the accumulation within the firm of knowledge in the corporate governance
domain. This may occur, for example, through observation of the other firms in the meta-
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institutional field, or through the transfer of knowledge from institutional owners (e.g.,
Dau, 2013).
The above arguments, based on the agency theory, information-processing, and
resource perspectives on the ID-CG relationship, lead to the following general causal
prediction:
Hypothesis 3: The degree of international diversification positively affects the
activation of corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem
and/or increasing the information-processing capacity of the firm.
Specifically, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 3a: The degree of international diversification positively affects
ownership concentration.
Hypothesis 3b: The degree of international diversification positively affects
institutional ownership.
Hypothesis 3c: The degree of international diversification positively affects board
independence.
Hypothesis 3d: The degree of international diversification positively affects the
separation of CEO and chairman positions.
Hypothesis 3e: The degree of international diversification positively affects inside
ownership.
Hypothesis 3f: The degree of international diversification positively affects the
level of CEO compensation.
Hypothesis 3g: The degree of international diversification positively affects board
size.
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Hypothesis 3h: The degree of international diversification positively affects CEO
tenure.
Figure 2.2 offers a representation of our theoretical model linking the degree of
international diversification to corporate governance.
Role of depth and breadth of firms’ degree of international diversification
As suggested by international management scholars, international diversification is a
multidimensional construct (e.g., Hitt et al., 2006). Specifically, depth and breadth are
two distinct dimensions of firms’ foreign footprint (e.g., George et al., 2005; Kafouros et
al., 2012). Depth refers to the scale of foreign activities, i.e., the extent of business
operations abroad (e.g., Thomas & Eden, 2004). Breadth, by contrast, refers to the scope
of the international expansion, i.e., the geographic reach around the world (e.g., Lu &
Beamish, 2004). These two dimensions, though interdependent, are characterized by
peculiar theoretical implications and, therefore, we suggest that distinguishing them may
be particularly relevant in the context of the CG-ID relationship. From an agency theory
perspective, the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the depth and breadth of
international diversification may differ, since managers’ risk preferences may reflect in
different attitudes towards the two dimensions. By definition, higher levels of breadth
entail dispersion of business operations across a larger number of host countries and
regions (e.g., George et al., 2005; Kafouros et al., 2012). This greater dispersion
intensifies the uncertainty about performance outcomes and the associated risks for firms
more than depth does. The implications of managers’ risk aversion in terms of suboptimal
foreign expansion, thus, may be more pronounced for decisions concerning the level of
breadth, rather than that of depth. Also from a resource perspective, firms’ corporate
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governance framework may have a greater impact on the breadth of international
diversification than on the depth. The better access to organizational and managerial
resources that certain corporate governance mechanisms provide, such as international
experience, industry expertise, and professional networks, may prove particularly
important when coping with the multiplicity and heterogeneity of external environments
associated with higher levels of breadth (e.g., Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Hence, from a
resource perspective, corporate governance mechanisms may affect top executives’
reluctance to increase the geographical reach of the firm more than their disinclination to
expand the scale of foreign operations.
The above arguments, based on the agency theory and resource perspectives, lead
to the following general causal predictions:
Hypothesis 4: The positive effect of corporate governance mechanisms addressing
the agency problem is stronger on the breadth than on the depth of international
diversification.
Hypothesis 5: The positive effect of corporate governance mechanisms providing
better access to organizational and managerial resources is stronger on the
breadth than on the depth of international diversification.
The agency theory, information-processing, and resource perspectives suggest
that the effect on corporate governance of depth and breadth of international
diversification may differ. From an agency theory perspective, one may argue that a
greater geographical outreach aggravates information asymmetries between managers
and owners more than a larger scale of foreign operations, due to the higher external and
internal complexity confronting the firm (e.g., Roth & O’Donnell, 1996; Sanders &
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Carpenter, 1998). Moreover, from an information-processing perspective, the higher
complexity that breadth implies in comparison to depth results in greater informationprocessing demands posed to the firm. More serious information asymmetries and greater
information-processing demands, in turn, may represent a stronger spur toward the
activation of corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem and/or
enabling information processing within the firm (e.g., Oxelheim et al. 2013). From a
resource perspective, the exposure to alternative organizational practices in a variety of
domains (including corporate governance) is, by definition, greater when expanding the
breadth of international diversification than when intensifying the depth. The stronger
learning effect associated with wider geographical reach allows firms to develop better
knowledge concerning the implementation and integration of those practices within the
organization, thus favoring their adoption (e.g., Marano & Kostova, 2016).
The above arguments, based on the agency theory, information-processing, and
resource perspectives on the ID-CG relationship, lead to the following general causal
prediction:
Hypothesis 6: The positive effect on the activation of corporate governance
mechanisms addressing the agency problem and/or increasing the informationprocessing capacity of the firm is stronger for the breadth than for the depth of
international diversification.
Effects of country-level moderators
Prior research says little on potential moderators altering the causal linkages between
corporate governance and international diversification. Below, from an agency theory
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perspective, we explore the potential moderating role of two country-level contingencies,
namely the legal protection of minority shareholders and uncertainty avoidance.
Legal protection of minority shareholders. Around the world, the adoption of
certain corporate governance mechanisms may be the outcome of rules, i.e., hard law
(e.g., Aguilera et al., 2010, 2012; Hopt, 2011). The law and finance literature points out
the importance of corporate law in protecting minority investors (e.g., La Porta et al.,
1998, 2000). Since the early 1980s, several countries have increased the level of legal
protection of minority shareholders; still, significant differences across countries remain
(e.g., Guillen & Capron, 2016; O’Sullivan, 2003). Herein, we argue that the role played
by soft corporate governance mechanisms on international diversification decisions may
vary, depending on the extent to which corporate law limits the agency costs incurred by
minority shareholders. As pointed out by some scholars, corporate governance
mechanisms may operate as substitutes, based on efficiency considerations in the quest
for the optimal organization of the firm (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Dalton et al.,
2003; Demsetz, 1983; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997). Building on corporate governance research on substitutability, we suggest
that the effect of soft corporate governance mechanisms on the extent of foreign
expansion may be stronger when voids in countries’ regulatory context (e.g., Khanna et
al., 2005) result in weaker legal protection from managerial opportunism.
The above arguments, based on the agency theory perspective, lead to the
following general causal prediction:
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Hypothesis 7: The positive effect of (soft) corporate governance mechanisms
addressing the agency problem on the degree of international diversification
weakens as the level of legal minority shareholder protection increases.
The legal protection of minority shareholders may moderate also the opposite
causal relationship. As discussed previously, international diversification, by aggravating
the principal-agent conflict, prompts the use of corporate governance mechanisms that
strengthen the monitoring of managerial behavior as well as the alignment of interests
between owners and managers (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Building again on
substitutability research, we suggest that, when the legal protection of minority
shareholders is higher, the push toward the activation of soft corporate governance
mechanisms is weaker, because the regulatory context already provides shareholders a
shield against managerial opportunism.
The above arguments, based on the agency theory perspective, lead to the
following general causal prediction:
Hypothesis 8: The positive effect of the degree of international diversification on
the activation of (soft) corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency
problem weakens as the level of legal minority shareholder protection increases.
Uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty avoidance, one of the dimensions of national
culture identified by Hofstede, refers to “the extent to which a culture programs its
members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations.
Unstructured situations are novel, unknown, surprising, different from usual” (Hofstede,
2001: xix). While Hofstede points out that “uncertainty avoidance does not equal risk
avoidance” (2001: 148, italics in the original), we argue that, when focusing on the effect
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of corporate governance on international diversification, the two constructs are strictly
interconnected. As discussed earlier, international diversification is characterized by
unusual uncertainty about performance outcomes, due to the liability of foreignness that
firms expanding abroad need to deal with (Ghemawat, 2001; Hymer, 1960; Mezias,
2002; Zaheer, 1995). The strategic nature of international diversification turns that
uncertainty into significant risks for firms, since this strategy implies long-term
commitment to a certain path that is potentially costly to reverse (Caves, 1984;
Ghemawat, 1991). We therefore suggest that, when uncertainty avoidance is higher, the
effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the degree of international diversification
is weaker, as the increase in uncertainty avoidance reflects in higher managerial aversion
to the risks associated with foreign expansion.
The above arguments, based on the agency theory perspective, lead to the
following general causal prediction:
Hypothesis 9: The positive effect of corporate governance mechanisms addressing
the agency problem on the degree of international diversification weakens as the
level of uncertainty avoidance increases.
METHODOLOGY
In order to investigate the CG-ID relationship we used MASEM, which combines the
techniques of structural equation modeling with those of meta-analysis (e.g., Cheung &
Chan, 2005; van Essen et al., 2015a). In particular, we followed the guidelines recently
outlined by Bergh and his colleagues (2016) for using MASEM to advance management
research. MASEM represents a more powerful technique than traditional meta-analysis,
as it allows to build on the existing body of empirical research (in our case focused on
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corporate governance and international diversification) in order to pit alternative complex
models (Bergh et al., 2016).
As a first step, we conducted a review of the management, economics, and
finance literatures to identify key theoretical perspectives on the CG-ID relationship and
all relevant study variables. After consulting studies that provide comprehensive reviews
of research on corporate governance (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2015; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997)
and international diversification (e.g., Hitt et al., 2006), we carried out an extensive
review of the literature on the CG-ID relationship (e.g., Filatotchev & Wright, 2011;
Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). This effort allowed us to identify the following relevant
corporate governance variables: ownership concentration, institutional ownership, board
independence, board size, separation of CEO and chairman positions, CEO tenure, CEO
pay, and inside ownership. We used those constructs to develop our theoretical arguments
about the CG-ID relationship, formulate our hypotheses, and thus identify a priori (Bergh
et al., 2016: 481) the general models to be tested. Those models are 1) the direct effects
model linking corporate governance mechanisms to the degree of international
diversification, based on Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2; 2) the direct effects model
linking the degree of international diversification to corporate governance mechanisms,
based on Hypothesis 3.
Sample and coding
Our sample consists of published and unpublished empirical studies analyzing the CG-ID
relationship, though not necessarily focused, from a theoretical perspective, on such
relationship. In order to identify as many relevant primary studies as possible, we
implemented multiple search strategies. First, we consulted several review articles (e.g.,
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Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Wu & Tihanyi, 2013). Second, we explored four major
electronic databases by conducting keyword searches focused on corporate governance
and international diversification. The electronic databases are the following: ABI Inform,
Business Source Premier, JSTOR, and Web of Science. We used the following search
terms: “corporate governance,” “governance,” “ownership structure”, “ownership
concentration,” “institutional ownership,” “board of directors,” “board composition,”
“board structure,” “board independence,” “board size,” “CEO/chief executive,” “CEO
duality,” “CEO tenure,” “CEO pay,” “CEO compensation,” and “inside ownership” with
regard to corporate governance (e.g., Bergh et al., 2016; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011);
“MNC,” “internationalization,” “international diversification,” “geographic
diversification,” “geographic expansion,” “international expansion,” and
“multinationality,” with regard to international diversification (e.g., Hitt et al., 2006;
Kirca et al., 2011). Third, using the initial set of studies collected through these two
search strategies, we identified relevant papers among those cited in the previously
retrieved articles and those citing them. In order to that, we used Google Scholar and
Web of Science. Combined, these strategies yielded an initial pool of over 4,000 papers
and a final sample of 104 primary studies. Each of the articles in the final sample
involved an empirical analysis, included the necessary statistical information (i.e.,
bivariate correlation coefficients and sample size), and used corporate governance and
international diversification measures that reflected conventional definitions of the
correspondent constructs (Bergh et al., 2016). In order to ensure that dependence of
samples would not represent a major problem in our analyses, we checked whether any
primary studies were authored by the same scholars and based on the same empirical

112

sample. We did not find any cases. Despite that, sample dependence may still be an issue
because primary studies may rely on the same large and accessible databases. However,
our final sample includes articles published over two decades (from 2000 to 2016),
covering a period of over forty years (1970-2012), and from different disciplines, thus
reasonably increasing the variation in data sources at satisfactory levels (Bergh et al.,
2016). Next, we read the sampled articles, developed a coding protocol (Lipsey &
Wilson, 2001), and collected data concerning the relationships of interest as well as the
study characteristics.
Measures
Corporate governance mechanisms. Based on our extensive review of the
literature on corporate governance and international diversification (e.g., Aguilera et al.,
2015; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Wu & Tihanyi, 2013), we
identified eight commonly studied corporate governance mechanisms: ownership
concentration, institutional ownership, board independence, board size, separation of
CEO and chairman positions, CEO tenure, CEO pay, and inside ownership. Ownership
concentration reflects the extent to which the firm’s outstanding stock is in the hands of
large shareholders. It is commonly measured as the percentage of the firm’s equity held
by those who own at least 3% or 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares, or the percentage of
shares held by the largest shareholders (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2005; La Porta et al., 1998;
Wan et al., 2008). Institutional ownership represents the extent to which the firm’s
outstanding shares are in the hands of institutional investors. It is commonly measured as
the percentage of the firm’s equity held by institutional investors, or the number of
institutional investors owning a firm’s stock (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2002; Johnson &
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Greening, 1999; Tihanyi et al., 2003). Board independence reflects the degree to which
the board of directors operates independently from corporate insiders. It is commonly
measured as the ratio of (independent) outside directors to the total number of board
members (e.g., Bhagat & Black, 2002; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Tihanyi et al., 2003).
Board size measures how large the board of directors is and is commonly measured as the
number of directors sitting on the firm’s board (e.g., Dalton et al., 1999; Sanders &
Carpenter, 1998). Separation of CEO and chairman positions refers to whether the CEO
has a tighter control of the firm’s strategic decision-making process. It is commonly
measured as a dummy variable taking value of 1 if the positions are held by different
board members and 0 if the same person jointly holds the two titles (e.g., Boyd, 1995;
Rechner & Dalton, 1991). CEO tenure reflects the continuity in the strategic management
of the firm. It is commonly measured as the number of years since the appointment of the
CEO (e.g., Bergh, 2016). CEO pay refers to the remuneration granted to the chief
executive. It is commonly measured as the level of compensation of the CEO (e.g.,
Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Inside ownership represents the extent to which the firm’s
outstanding shares are in the hands of corporate insiders. It is commonly measured as the
percentage of equity owned by inside directors or members of the top management team
(e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2002).
Degree of international diversification. The degree of international
diversification refers to the size of firms’ foreign footprint, i.e., the extent to which one or
more value chain activities are performed abroad. International management scholars
have operationalized the construct in a number of ways (e.g., Lu & Beamish, 2004;
Sullivan, 1994; Thomas & Eden, 2004). Foreign sales to total sales (e.g., Tallman & Li,
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1996), foreign assets to total assets (e.g., Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999), foreign
employees to total employees (e.g., Brock & Yaffe, 2008), foreign subsidiaries to total
subsidiaries (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997), and total exports to total sales (e.g., Lu
& Beamish, 2001) are common measures of the depth of international diversification, i.e.,
the scale of the activities that are conducted outside the home country (e.g., Thomas &
Eden, 2004). Number of countries (e.g., Delios & Beamish, 1999), number of regions
(e.g., Kim, Hoskisson, & Wan, 2004), dispersion across countries (e.g., Goerzen &
Beamish, 2003), and dispersion across regions (e.g., Hitt et al., 1997) are common
measures of the breadth of international diversification, i.e., the geographic scope of a
firm’s foreign operations (e.g., Thomas & Eden, 2004).
Legal protection of minority shareholders. We measured the legal protection of
minority shareholder using the index developed by Guillen and Capron (2016). The index
was developed using cross-country longitudinal data from 78 developed and developing
countries, covering the 1970-2011 period. The two scholars gathered information on ten
legal provisions regarded as key for the protection of minority shareholder rights,
including, among others, board independence, feasibility of directors’ dismissal,
derivative suit, and disclosure of major share ownership: “If present, each of these legal
provisions provides minority shareholders with a comprehensive set of protections
against the actions of large shareholders and/or management and in the event of a change
in corporate control” (Guillen and Capron, 2016: 136). The index ranges from 0 to 10,
with each legal provision receiving a score between 0 and 1.
Uncertainty avoidance. In his study of how values in the workplace are
influenced by culture, Hofstede (2001) identified power distance, individualism,

115

masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation as dimensions of national
culture. We measured country-level uncertainty avoidance using the time-invariant
country scores provided by Hofstede (2001).
Control variables. In order to minimize omitted-variable bias, we also included
several firm-level control variables: firm size, firm age, debt-to-equity ratio, product
diversification, R&D intensity, and firm performance. Firm size is any indicator of the
size of the firm, such as a firm’s total assets, sales, or employees (e.g., Goerzen &
Beamish, 2003). Firm age is any indicator of the age of the firm, such as the number of
years since establishment (e.g., Zahra et al., 2000). Debt-to-equity ratio reflects the
degree of financial leverage of the firm, measured as the ratio of total debt to total equity
(e.g., Goerzen & Beamish, 2003). Product diversification is a variable that reflects the
diversification across industries of the firm, commonly operationalized using the
Herfindahl or entropy index (e.g., Tallman & Li, 1996). R&D intensity is a variable that
reflects the degree of R&D expenditure of the firm, commonly operationalized as the
ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales or employees (e.g., Li & Tallman, 2011). Firm
performance is any indicator of the financial performance of the firm, including
accounting- and market-based measures of performance (e.g., Hitt et al., 1997).
MASEM procedure
To test our hypotheses, we used MASEM (Bergh et al., 2016; Carney et al., 2011;
Cheung & Chan, 2005; van Essen et al., 2015a). In the first step of the two-stage
procedure, we computed mean correlations between the variables of interest through
separate Hedges-Olkin meta-analyses (HOMAs) in Stata 13 (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). In
order to run the HOMAs, we first collected from the primary studies the bivariate
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correlations (i.e., Pearson’s r) between all the variables of interest. We followed
established guidelines and chose the effect size, rather than the article, as our unit of
analysis (Bergh et al., 2016). When multiple operationalizations of the constructs
concerning a focal effect were used in a primary study, we included all of them in our
analyses.4 Each effect size was weighted by its inverse variance weight w to account for
differences across effect sizes (Hedges & Olkin, 1985).5 When computing the weighted
mean correlations, we used a 1.0 reliability estimate for all the variables. We used a 1.0
level of reliability because the variables of interest for our study are not particularly
exposed to measurement error, since they do not leave much room for subjectivity to
researchers carrying out a primary study. While a conservative 0.80 reliability estimate is
recommended by some scholars (e.g., Aguinis et al., 2011), both Dalton and his
colleagues (1998) and Bergh and his colleagues (2016) did not find any substantive
difference in the results of their meta-analyses when using a 1.0 level of reliability
instead of a 0.80 level. In order to compute the weighted mean correlations, we run
random-effects HOMAs, which are more conservative than fixed-effects HOMAs and
account for potential heterogeneity in the effect size distribution (Kisamore & Brannick,
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Research has shown that including all the effect sizes, as opposed to including a single value for each
study, provides advantages in terms of parameter significance testing and parameter estimation accuracy
(Bijmolt & Pieters, 2001).
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2008). When running the HOMAs, we also computed the standard error for each mean
correlation.6
In the second step of the two-stage procedure, we run structural equation
modeling (SEM) using maximum-likelihood routines in LISREL 8 (Cheung & Chan,
2005). The meta-analytic matrix of mean correlations provided the data to run SEM and
no cell contained missing values. MASEM has the advantage that not all relationships
under examination need to be included in each primary study, as each cell in the metaanalytic matrix of mean correlations is a different subset of all included studies (Carney
et al., 2011; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995). We based our SEM estimation of the
coefficients on the harmonic mean of the sample sizes. This allowed us to deal with the
sample size differences and reduce the concern that larger samples might affect the
estimation more than smaller samples (Bergh et al., 2016; Carney et al., 2011; van Essen
et al., 2015a). Below is the equation that we estimated to test Hypothesis 1 and
Hypothesis 2:
Degree of ID = Σ βi CG Mechanismi + Σ γj Controlj + ε

(1)

where Degree of ID is the extent of foreign expansion, CG Mechanismi is the
individual corporate governance mechanism, and Controlj is the individual control
variable. In order to test Hypothesis 3, we estimated the following equation:
CG Mechanismi = β1 Degree of ID + Σ γj Controlj + ε
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Lower  ES  1.96(seES ) ,

The tests of Hypotheses 4-6 required a distinction between depth and breadth of
international diversification, rather than a focus on the overall degree of expansion
abroad. Therefore, we simultaneously estimated the following two equations to test
Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5:
Depth of ID = Σ βi CG Mechanismi + Σ γj Controlj + ε

(3)

Breadth of ID = Σ βi CG Mechanismi + Σ γj Controlj + ε

(4)

Furthermore, we estimated the equation reported below to test Hypothesis 6:
CG Mechanismi = β1 Depth of ID + β2 Breadth of ID + Σ γj Controlj + ε (5)
In order to test Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8, which focus on the moderating
effect of the legal protection of minority shareholders, we split the data set into two
subsets using the median value of the country-level contingency. Next, we computed two
different meta-analytic correlation matrices, respectively for high and low levels of legal
shareholder protection. Then, to test Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8, we estimated again,
respectively, Equation (1) and Equation (2) for both high and low levels of the legal
protection of minority shareholders.
Similarly, to assess the moderating effect of country-level uncertainty avoidance,
on which Hypothesis 9 focuses, we divided the sample into two subsamples based on the
median value of this national culture dimension. Next, we computed two different metaanalytic correlation matrices, respectively for high and low levels of uncertainty
avoidance. Then, to test Hypothesis 9, we estimated again Equation (1) for both high and
low levels of uncertainty avoidance.
Due to meta-analytic data availability, when testing Hypotheses 6-9, we focus
only on three (soft) corporate governance mechanisms, which we previously discussed
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from an agency theory perspective: ownership concentration, institutional ownership, and
inside ownership.
RESULTS
Table 2.1 reports the meta-analytic correlation matrix, which shows, with regard to the
CG-ID relationship, a negative mean effect size for ownership concentration (r-based
mean effect size = -0.005; p = 0.775) and inside ownership (r-based mean effect size = 0.029; p = 0.102), and a positive mean effect size for institutional ownership (r-based
mean effect size = 0.016; p = 0.326), CEO/chairman separation (r-based mean effect size
= 0.026; p = 0.305), CEO pay (r-based mean effect size = 0.115; p = 0.021), and board
independence (r-based mean effect size = 0.012; p = 0.585). Therefore, while some
corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem have a positive
association with the degree of international diversification, others are negatively
correlated to it. Table 2.1 also shows that the corporate governance mechanisms
providing better access to organizational and managerial resources, i.e., CEO tenure (rbased mean effect size = 0.025; p = 0.229) and board size (r-based mean effect size =
0.079; p = 0.0001) are positively associated with the degree of international
diversification. The results of the HOMAs, however, do not give any information about
the direction of causality, since they are based on Pearson’s r. Moreover, they do not take
into account the interdependencies among the corporate governance mechanisms, as well
as the effect of control variables.
Effects of corporate governance on the degree of international diversification
Table 2.2 shows the MASEM results for the direct effects model (Model 1) linking
corporate governance mechanisms to the degree of international diversification, based on
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Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. In this model, each corporate governance variable is
related directly to the degree of international diversification. Moreover, each corporate
governance variable covaries with the other corporate governance variables and the firmlevel controls, which, instead, covaries only with the corporate governance variables.7
Furthermore, independent and dependent variables are observed variables; no latent
construct is included in the model.
Regarding Hypothesis 1, our results show that ownership concentration
(coefficient = -0.0077, t value = -0.59), inside ownership (coefficient = -0.012, t value = 0.84), and board independence (coefficient = -0.0083, t value = -0.63) are negatively
related to the size of the foreign footprint. However, the mean effect sizes, especially for
ownership concentration and board independence, are quite small. By contrast,
institutional ownership (coefficient = 0.012, t value = 0.89), CEO/chairman separation
(coefficient = 0.046, t value = 3.12), and CEO pay (coefficient = 0.078, t value = 3.97)
are positively related to the degree of international diversification. The effect of
institutional ownership, though, is quite small compared to the effect of CEO/chairman
separation and CEO pay. Overall, our findings provide partial empirical support for the
idea that corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem positively
affect the degree of international diversification. With regard to Hypothesis 2, we find
that CEO tenure (coefficient = 0.040, t value = 2.80) is positively associated with the
degree of international diversification. By contrast, the effect of board size (coefficient =
-0.020, t value = -1.19) on the extent of foreign expansion is negative, though smaller in
magnitude than that of CEO tenure. Our results, therefore, provide partial empirical
support for the idea that corporate governance mechanisms providing better access to
7

This is necessary to have enough degrees of freedom to estimate the model.
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organizational and managerial resources are positively related to the degree of
international diversification. Figure 2.3 offers a schematic representation of our results
concerning the effect of corporate governance on the degree of international
diversification.
The direct effects model linking corporate governance mechanisms to the degree
of international diversification fits the data relatively well ( -square (15) = 784.03, pvalue < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.096; CFI = 0.91; NFI = 0.90; RMR = 0.039).
Effects of the degree of international diversification on corporate governance
Table 2.3 shows the results of the direct effects model (Model 2) linking the degree of
international diversification to corporate governance mechanisms, based on Hypothesis 3.
In this model, the degree of international diversification is related directly to each
corporate governance variable. Moreover, the firm-level control variables do not covary
with one another.8 Furthermore, independent and dependent variables are observed
variables; no latent construct is included in the model. Our results show that the degree of
international diversification is negatively related to ownership concentration (coefficient
= -0.008, t value = -0.58) and institutional ownership (coefficient = -0.003, t value = 0.25), even though the mean effect sizes are very small. Furthermore, the effect of foreign
expansion on inside ownership (coefficient = -0.005, t value = -0.36) and board
independence (coefficient = -0.007, t value = -0.50) is negative, although―again―the
mean effect sizes are very small. We also find that the degree of international
diversification is positively associated with board size (coefficient = 0.013, t value =
1.02), CEO tenure (coefficient = 0.024, t value = 1.73), CEO pay (coefficient = 0.036, t
value = 3.03), and CEO/chairman separation (coefficient = 0.016, t value = 1.19). Our
8
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results, therefore, provide partial empirical support for the idea that the degree of
international diversification positively influences the activation of corporate governance
mechanisms addressing the agency problem and/or increasing the information-processing
capacity of the firm. Figure 2.4 offers a schematic representation of our results
concerning the effect of the degree of international diversification on corporate
governance.
The direct effects model linking the degree of international diversification to
corporate governance mechanisms achieves worse fit than the direct effects model
linking corporate governance mechanisms to the degree of international diversification
( -square (43) = 4222.66, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.132; CFI = 0.39; NFI = 0.39;
RMR = 0.076). This suggests that corporate governance explains the variation of
international diversification better than international diversification explains the variation
of corporate governance.
Effects of corporate governance on the depth and breadth of international
diversification
Table 2.4 shows the results for the direct effects model (Model 3) linking corporate
governance mechanisms to depth and breadth of international diversification, based on
Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5. In this model, each corporate governance variable is
related directly to depth and breadth of international diversification. Moreover, each
corporate governance variable covaries with the other corporate governance variables and
the firm-level controls, which, instead, covaries only with the corporate governance
variables.9 Furthermore, independent and dependent variables are observed variables; no
latent construct is included in the model. With regard to Hypothesis 4, our results show
9
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that ownership concentration negatively affects the depth of foreign expansion
(coefficient = -0.019, t value = -1.44), but positively influences the breadth (coefficient =
0.028, t value = 2.28). Similarly, institutional ownership has a negative, though very
small, effect on the depth of international diversification (coefficient = -0.0033, t value =
-0.24), but a positive effect on the breadth (coefficient = 0.09, t value = 7.08). Moreover,
CEO/chairman separation and CEO pay positively affect both dimensions of international
diversification, but the effect on breadth (coefficient for CEO/chairman separation =
0.094, t value = 6.89; coefficient for CEO pay = 0.32, t value = 17.35) is stronger than the
effect on depth (coefficient for CEO/chairman separation = 0.040, t value = 2.74;
coefficient for CEO pay = 0.045, t value = 2.34). By contrast, inside ownership and board
independence have a positive, though very small, effect on the depth of international
diversification (coefficient for inside ownership = 0.0036, t value = 0.27; coefficient for
board independence = 0.0043, t value = 0.33), but a negative effect on the breadth
(coefficient for inside ownership = -0.066, t value = -5.20; coefficient for board
independence = -0.085, t value = -6.96). Our findings, therefore, provide partial empirical
support for the idea that the positive effect of corporate governance mechanisms
addressing the agency problem is stronger on the breadth than on the depth of
international diversification.
Regarding Hypothesis 5, our results show that CEO tenure positively influences
both dimensions of international diversification, but the effect on depth (coefficient =
0.042, t value = 3.03) is larger than that on breadth (coefficient = 0.034, t value = 2.59).
Also, board size has a positive effect on the depth of international diversification
(coefficient = 0.017, t value = 1.01), but a negative effect on the breadth (coefficient = -

124

0.22, t value = -14.29). Our findings, therefore, do not provide empirical support for the
idea that the positive effect of corporate governance mechanisms providing better access
to organizational and managerial resources is stronger on the breadth than on the depth of
international diversification.
Effects of the depth and breadth of international diversification on corporate
governance
Table 2.5 shows the results of the direct effects model (Model 4) linking depth and
breadth of international diversification to corporate governance mechanisms, based on
Hypothesis 6. In this model, the dimensions of international diversification are related
directly to each corporate governance variable. Moreover, the firm-level control variables
do not covary with one another.10 Furthermore, independent and dependent variables are
observed variables; no latent construct is included in the model. Our results show that the
depth of foreign expansion has a negative effect on ownership concentration (coefficient
= -0.022, t value = -1.61); by contrast, the breadth has a positive effect (coefficient =
0.022, t value = 1.56). Similarly, the depth of international diversification negatively
affects institutional ownership (coefficient = -0.016, t value = -1.21), while the breadth
positively influences it (coefficient = 0.028, t value = 1.99). Moreover, both dimensions
of international diversification positively affect CEO pay, but the effect of breadth
(coefficient = 0.11, t value = 8.98) is stronger than the effect of depth (coefficient =
0.0068, t value = 0.58). Both depth and breadth have a positive effect on CEO tenure;
however, unlike their effect on CEO pay, the effect of depth (coefficient = 0.027, t value
= 1.94) is stronger than the effect of breadth (coefficient = 0.0035, t value = 0.25). By
contrast, the depth of foreign expansion positively influences inside ownership,
10
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CEO/chairman separation, and board independence (coefficient for inside ownership =
0.013, t value = 0.96; coefficient for CEO/chairman separation = 0.017, t value = 1.25;
coefficient for board independence = 0.023, t value = 1.72), while the breadth negatively
affects those corporate governance mechanisms (coefficient for inside ownership = 0.036, t value = -2.60; coefficient for CEO/chairman separation = -0.00056, t value = 0.04; coefficient for board independence = -0.085, t value = -6.05). Our findings,
therefore, provide partial empirical support for the idea that the positive effect on the
activation of corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem and/or
increasing the information-processing capacity of the firm is stronger for the breadth than
for the depth of international diversification.
Similar to the comparison between the fit of Model 1 and that of Model 2, the fit
of Model 3 ( -square (16) = 1140.66, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.110; CFI = 0.89; NFI
= 0.89; RMR = 0.042), which links corporate governance mechanisms to depth and
breadth of international diversification, is better than that of the Model 4 ( -square (43) =
4566.22, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.134, CFI = 0.45, NFI = 0.45, RMR = 0.072),
which links depth and breadth of international diversification to corporate governance
mechanisms. This suggests that corporate governance explains the variation of the
international diversification dimensions better than the international diversification
dimensions explain the variation of corporate governance.
Moderating effect of the legal protection of minority shareholders on CGID
Table 2.6 shows the results for the direct effects models linking, based on Hypothesis 7,
corporate governance mechanisms to the degree of international diversification under
conditions of high (Model 5) and low (Model 6) legal protection of minority
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shareholders. In these models, each corporate governance variable is related directly to
the degree of international diversification. Our results show that ownership concentration
negatively affects the degree of international diversification when the legal protection of
minority shareholders is high (coefficient = -0.033, t value = -5.46), but positively
influences it when the legal protection of minority shareholders is low (coefficient =
0.034, t value = 3.78). Moreover, institutional ownership has a positive, though small,
effect on the extent of foreign expansion both when the legal shareholder protection is
high (coefficient = 0.00093, t value = 0.15) and when this country-level contingency is
low (coefficient = 0.0055, t value = 0.62), but the effect is larger in the latter case. By
contrast, inside ownership has a negative effect on the degree of international
diversification both when the legal shareholder protection is high (coefficient = -0.011, t
value = -1.75) and when this country-level contingency is low (coefficient = -0.0055, t
value = -0.60), but the effect is larger in the former case. Our findings, therefore, provide
very limited empirical support for the idea that the positive effect of (soft) corporate
governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem on the degree of international
diversification weakens as the level of legal minority shareholder protection increases.
Moderating effect of the legal protection of minority shareholders on IDCG
Table 2.7 shows the results for the direct effects models linking, based on Hypothesis 8,
the degree of international diversification to corporate governance mechanisms under
conditions of high (Model 7) and low (Model 8) legal protection of minority
shareholders. In these models, the degree of international diversification is related
directly to each corporate governance variable. Our results show that the degree of
international diversification negatively affects ownership concentration when the legal
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protection of minority shareholders is high (coefficient = -0.033, t value = -5.41), but
positively influences it when the legal protection of minority shareholders is low
(coefficient = 0.034, t value = 3.67). Similarly, institutional ownership has a negative,
though very small, effect on the extent of foreign expansion when the legal shareholder
protection is high (coefficient = -0.00016, t value = -0.027), but a positive one, though
very small, when this country-level contingency is low (coefficient = 0.001, t value =
0.11). By contrast, the degree of international diversification negatively affects inside
ownership both when the legal shareholder protection is high (coefficient = -0.0096, t
value = -1.59) and when this country-level contingency is low (coefficient = -0.00078, t
value = -0.089), but the effect is larger in the former case. Our findings, therefore,
provide very limited empirical support for the idea that the positive effect of the degree of
international diversification on the activation of (soft) corporate governance mechanisms
addressing the agency problem weakens as the level of legal minority shareholder
protection increases.
Similar to the comparison between the fit of Model 1 and that of Model 2, the fit
of Model 5 ( -square (3) = 749.09, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.095; CFI = 0.83; NFI =
0.83; RMR = 0.026), which links corporate governance mechanisms to the degree of
international diversification when the legal shareholder protection is high, is higher than
that of the Model 7 ( -square (6) = 1208.23, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.085; CFI =
0.73; NFI = 0.73; RMR = 0.033), which links the degree of international diversification
to corporate governance mechanisms when the legal shareholder protection is high.
Similarly, the fit of Model 6 ( -square (3) = 219.58, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.076;
CFI = 0.93; NFI = 0.93; RMR = 0.022), which links corporate governance mechanisms to
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the degree of international diversification when the legal shareholder protection is low, is
higher than that of the Model 8 ( -square (8) = 819.54, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA =
0.104; CFI = 0.75; NFI = 0.75; RMR = 0.041), which links the degree of international
diversification to corporate governance mechanisms when the legal shareholder
protection is low. This suggests―again―that corporate governance explains the
variation of international diversification better than international diversification explains
the variation of corporate governance.
Moderating effect of national uncertainty avoidance on CGID
Table 2.8 shows the results for the direct effects models linking, based on Hypothesis 9,
corporate governance mechanisms to the degree of international diversification under
conditions of high (Model 9) and low (Model 10) uncertainty avoidance. In these models,
each corporate governance variable is related directly to the degree of international
diversification. Our results show that ownership concentration negatively affects the
degree of international diversification when uncertainty avoidance is high (coefficient = 0.010, t value = -0.69), but positively influences it when uncertainty avoidance is low
(coefficient = 0.028, t value = 5.93). Similarly, institutional ownership has a negative
effect on the degree of international diversification when uncertainty avoidance is high
(coefficient = -0.13, t value = -8.84), but a positive one when uncertainty avoidance is
low (coefficient = 0.046, t value = 9.64). Also, inside ownership negatively influences the
degree of international diversification when uncertainty avoidance is high (coefficient = 0.047, t value = -3.20), but positively affects it when uncertainty avoidance is low
(coefficient = 0.010, t value = 2.18). Our findings, therefore, provide partial empirical
support for the idea that the positive effect of corporate governance mechanisms
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addressing the agency problem on the degree of international diversification weakens as
the level of uncertainty avoidance increases.
DISCUSSION
The inconclusive and inconsistent empirical findings about the CG-ID relationship were
the starting point of this meta-analytic study, in which we explored the complex
interdependence between corporate governance and international diversification.
Causal linkages between corporate governance and international diversification
The first key finding of our MASEM study is that, as the agency theory, resource, and
information-processing perspectives suggest, bidirectional causal linkages exist between
corporate governance and international diversification. This important finding
constructively addresses the potential scientific apophenia (i.e., the tendency to find
evidence of order where none exists) in the CG-ID research area (e.g., Goldfarb & King,
2016; Harrison et al., 2014). It also shows the multifaceted interdependence between
corporate governance and international diversification (e.g., Buckley & Strange, 2011;
Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). Furthermore, it provides additional evidence in support of
the complementarity and substitutability between corporate governance mechanisms at
the firm level (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2008, 2012; Dalton et al., 2003).
The agency theory perspective suggests that certain corporate governance
mechanisms will positively affect international diversification by curbing the agency
problem resulting from managerial risk aversion. Our findings show that institutional
ownership, CEO/chairman separation, and CEO compensation have this role of foreign
expansion facilitators. Therefore, our study adds to the body of empirical evidence
showing the role played by those mechanisms in the principal-agent relationship.
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Interestingly, however, we find that inside ownership has a negative effect on the extent
of foreign expansion, which corroborates the idea in the management and finance
literatures that the use of equity for compensation results in greater incentives to ‘play it
safe’, as a larger slice of executives’ financial wealth is linked to the firm’s prospects
(e.g., Gormley & Matsa, 2016). Also, ownership concentration and board independence
have a negative impact on the degree of international diversification. Their effect,
however, is very small, suggesting that a more nuanced relationship may exist, depending
on whether the focus is on the depth or breadth of international diversification.
The resource perspective suggests that certain corporate governance mechanisms
will positively affect the degree of international diversification by providing better access
to organizational and managerial resources. Consistent with the idea that a longer tenure
may better equip CEOs to cope with the challenges of such a resource-intensive and risky
move as international diversification, we find that this corporate governance mechanism
has a positive effect on expansion abroad. By contrast, board size has a negative effect on
the degree of international diversification. While counterintuitive from a resource
perspective, this result may be explained through an agency theory lens. Corporate
governance scholars point out that larger boards may aggravate the agency problem,
amplifying the effect of managerial risk aversion: “even if boards’ capacities for
monitoring increase with board size, the benefits are outweighed by such costs as slower
decision-making, less-candid discussions of managerial performance, and biases against
risk-taking” (Yermack, 1996: 186).
In addition to the impact of firms’ corporate governance mechanisms on the
degree of international diversification, our MASEM results provide support for the
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prediction that foreign expansion prompts the activation of corporate governance
mechanisms addressing the agency problem and/or increasing the information processing
capacity of the firm. Consistent with previous international management research, we
find that the higher information-processing demands and/or greater information
asymmetries associated with larger operations abroad result in longer CEO tenure, higher
CEO pay, CEO/chairman separation, and larger board size (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter,
1998). Furthermore, the effect on CEO/chairman separation provides empirical support
for an institution-based resource perspective (e.g., Kostova et al., 2008; Marano et al.,
2016) on corporate governance, since CEO/chairman separation is one of the
“mechanisms largely held as “silver bullets” for the governance problem” (Misangyi &
Acharya, 2014: 1702). Similar considerations may be made also for CEO compensation,
given its central position in the agency framework since the development of agency
theory (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 2010; van Essen et al., 2015b).
The role of depth and breadth of international diversification
The second key finding of our MASEM study is that the nature of the causal linkages in
the CG-ID relationship depends on the dimension of international diversification. While
the international management literature has clearly pointed out that international
diversification is a multidimensional construct (e.g., Hitt et al., 2006), extant research
says little about whether and how depth and breadth differently affect and/or are
differently affected by corporate governance. Our findings improve our understanding of
this relevant theoretical aspect. From an agency theory perspective, we predicted that
certain corporate governance mechanisms have a stronger positive effect on the breadth
of foreign expansion than on the depth. Consistent with our prediction, CEO/chairman
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separation and CEO pay positively affect both dimensions of international diversification,
but breadth to a larger extent. Furthermore, ownership concentration and institutional
ownership negatively influence depth, but positively breadth. The negative effect on the
depth of international diversification suggests that shareholders with the ability,
incentive, and power to monitor and control managers (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2007;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) may limit executives’ pursuit of the private benefits associated
with an increase in the size of the foreign footprint (e.g., Buckley & Strange, 2011;
Morck & Yeung, 1991). Expansion abroad implies larger firm size, which may affect
power, reputation, and compensation of executives (e.g., Buckley & Strange, 2011).
Also, such a risky strategic move as international diversification may protect managers’
job, since it makes harder to assess their contribution to performance and, thus, their
managerial skills (e.g., Hermalin, 1993). At the same time, the positive effect of
ownership concentration and institutional ownership on the breadth of international
diversification suggests that the aforementioned shareholders may seek the benefits, in
terms of development and expansion of the resource endowment, associated with greater
institutional, competitive, and technological heterogeneity of the ‘host-country portfolio’
(e.g., Kafouros et al., 2012; Kostova et al., 2008). Our findings regarding the effect of
inside ownership (positive effect on depth and negative on breadth) do not support our
prediction. However, those findings are consistent with the idea, previously discussed,
that the use of equity for compensation results in greater managerial risk aversion.
Managers, therefore, may pursue the private benefits associated with depth, while
avoiding the risks inherent in breadth. Finally, the fact that board independence has a
negative effect on the breadth of international diversification and almost no effect on the
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depth seems to point out the intrinsic limitations of this corporate governance
mechanism, e.g., the actual independence of outside directors, as well as the hurdles to its
proper functioning, including board processes and board culture (e.g., Pye, 2001; Udueni,
1999).
Also from a resource perspective, we predicted that certain corporate governance
mechanisms have a stronger positive effect on the breadth of foreign expansion than on
the depth. Our findings do not support such prediction. The positive effect of board size
on depth and the negative effect on breadth, while counterintuitive from a resource
perspective, may be explained from an agency theory perspective. As discussed above,
larger boards may exacerbate the agency problem and, consequently, favor the pursuit of
the private benefits of depth and the avoidance of the risks of breadth by the top
management. As regards CEO tenure, our findings suggest that longer tenures provide
access to organizational and managerial resources that are industry- and host countryspecific and, thus, more fruitful when expanding the depth rather than the breadth.
The distinction between depth and breadth is relevant also when focusing on the
effect of international diversification on corporate governance mechanisms. However,
our prediction of a greater positive effect of breadth than of depth receives support only
for CEO compensation, ownership concentration, and institutional ownership.
The moderating role of the legal shareholder protection and uncertainty avoidance
The third key finding of our MASEM study is that the CG-ID relationship is moderated
by two country-level contingencies: the legal protection of minority shareholders and
uncertainty avoidance. Previous research says little about potential factors affecting the
CG-ID relationship. Our study, therefore, sheds some preliminary light on this additional
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aspect of the complex causal interdependence between corporate governance and
international diversification.
Specifically, our findings do not suggest a strong substitution (e.g., Dalton et al.,
2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) across levels between hard and soft corporate governance
mechanisms. However, the fact that ownership concentration has a non-negligible
positive effect on the degree of international diversification when the legal protection of
minority shareholders is low, and a non-negligible negative one when the country-level
contingency is high, suggests that controlling shareholders may have, within distinct
national corporate governance systems, different perceptions of expansion abroad. The
legal protection of minority shareholders moderates the relationship between ownership
concentration and international diversification also when focusing on the opposite
direction of causality. International diversification may naturally lead to more dispersed
ownership when the legal protection of minority shareholders is high (e.g., Luo, 2005).
However, consistent with an agency theory perspective, ownership concentration is
activated as a response to increases in the foreign footprint when the legal shareholder
protection is low.
Our findings also show that uncertainty avoidance moderates the effect of
corporate governance mechanisms on the degree of international diversification to such
an extent that their effect turns negative when uncertainty avoidance is high.
Explanatory power of the alternative directions of causality
The fourth key finding of our MASEM study is that corporate governance explains the
variation of international diversification better than international diversification explains
the variation of corporate governance. In all comparisons of the fit of CGID models
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versus that of IDCG models, the fit of the models linking corporate governance
mechanisms to the degree of international diversification is better. This suggests, from
both a theory and practice perspective, the primary ex-ante (as opposed to ex-post) nature
of corporate governance mechanisms.
MASEM versus traditional meta-analysis
The fifth key finding of our MASEM study is that the magnitude and sign of the CG-ID
relationship in the MASEM results are, in some cases, different from those in the HOMA
results. This confirms the importance, when conducting meta-analytic studies, of going
beyond traditional techniques, in order to take into account the interdependencies
between all the independent variables as well as the effect of control variables (e.g.,
Bergh et al., 2016). Our study, therefore, is consistent with recent best practices in
management research as to how conduct meta-analyses, including the use of partial
correlation as effect size, MARA techniques, and MASEM techniques (e.g., Carney et
al., 2011; van Essen et al., 2012, 2015a).
Lastly, we point out that, when studying whether and how corporate governance
mechanisms affect firms’ expansion abroad and vice versa, endogeneity is a relevant
issue due to potential reverse causality effects. A limitation of our study, therefore, is that
meta-analytic techniques, including MASEM, are not ideal for addressing endogeneity
issues. We, therefore, encourage scholars exploring in the future the CG-ID relationship
to incorporate in their research design solutions to address this potential methodological
issue. Strictly related to this, we believe that our study may be fruitfully complemented
by further research using different data and methodologies. For example, research based
on secondary data could explore whether and how the ratio of fixed to variable executive
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compensation, which is a variable difficult to measure within a meta-analytic research
design, affects and/or is affected by firms’ degree of international diversification.
Similarly, future research based on secondary data could explore the effect of different
ownership identities on the extent of foreign expansion. While data on ownership identity
may be collected within a meta-analytic research design, measurement error is likely to
be higher, especially when considering identity in conjunction with the owned share of
the firm equity.
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TABLE 2.1: Meta-Analytic Correlation Matrix
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Variable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Firm size

1.000

194,302

174,268

21,489

8,576

248,556

59,213

39,137

2. Firm age

0.194

1.000

141,042

13,873

5,337

165,614

35,785

21,289

3. Debt-to-equity
ratio

0.087

0.016

1.000

10,640

3,966

171,022

33,748

25,398

4. CEO tenure

-0.020

-0.018

-0.069

1.000

8,042

13,079

12,260

7,197

5. CEO pay

0.461

0.228

0.140

-0.062

1.000

4,412

6,310

4,134

0.027

0.000

0.010

0.108

-0.061

1.000

48,324

33,693

0.103

0.076

0.046

-0.016

-0.091

-0.051

1.000

10,207

-0.094

-0.066

-0.046

0.253

-0.082

0.009

0.102

1.000

0.036

0.091

-0.025

-0.246

-0.229

0.035

-0.026

-0.123

0.067

-0.017

0.022

-0.067

0.086

-0.069

0.014

-0.080

0.338

0.129

0.012

-0.113

0.561

-0.010

0.077

-0.171

0.189

0.164

0.013

-0.022

0.067

-0.014

0.092

-0.052

0.171

0.026

-0.024

0.025

0.115

-0.005

0.016

-0.029

14. R&D intensity

0.055

-0.047

-0.109

0.026

0.042

-0.005

-0.006

-0.057

15. Performance

0.057

-0.010

-0.110

0.055

0.147

0.005

0.020

0.018

6. Ownership
concentration
7. Institutional
ownership
8. Inside
ownership
9. CEO/chairman
separation
10. Board
independence
11. Board size
12. Product
diversification
13. International
diversification

TABLE 2.1: Meta-Analytic Correlation Matrix (continued)
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Variable

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1. Firm size

7,129

55,255

64,440

139,740

381,029

72,106

230,470

2. Firm age

3,518

26,507

25,934

89,957

293,283

31,152

143,108

3. Debt-to-equity
ratio

3,225

13,773

25,617

86,363

277,666

40,869

143,463

4. CEO tenure

3,622

4,000

1,165

5,699

23,758

8,647

9,480

5. CEO pay

620

3,048

192

17,131

22,986

928

1,834

2,869

8,924

33,147

167,320

265,302

73,898

109,019

3,780

5,894

18,848

4,217

62,143

39,484

65,486

2,615

10,382

2,472

22,610

45,727

8,086

32,577

1.000

2,955

2,410

5,652

9,520

3,227

6,001

-0.027

1.000

33,186

13,493

84,993

5,490

42,457

0.038

0.049

1.000

2,057

110,382

17,327

23,591

-0.035

0.067

0.215

1.000

170,451

30,426

100,205

0.026

0.012

0.079

0.084

1.000

88,137

248,494

14. R&D intensity

0.036

0.028

0.011

0.012

0.165

1.000

64104

15. Performance

0.051

0.020

0.086

0.001

0.037

-0.009

1.000

6. Ownership
concentration
7. Institutional
ownership
8. Inside
ownership
9. CEO/chairman
separation
10. Board
independence
11. Board size
12. Product
diversification
13. International
diversification

Cells below the diagonal contain mean correlations. Cells above the diagonal contain the total number of observations (N)

TABLE 2.2: MASEM Results for CGID
Model 1
International diversification
Firm size

0.12
(0.015)
(8.36)

Firm age

-0.022
(0.014)
(-1.60)

Debt-to-equity ratio

-0.025
(0.013)
(-1.91)

Product diversification

0.063
(0.013)
(4.67)

R&D intensity

0.15
(0.013)
(11.27)

Performance

0.014
(0.013)
(1.05)

CEO tenure

0.040
(0.014)
(2.80)

CEO pay

0.078
(0.020)
(3.97)

Ownership concentration

-0.0077
(0.013)
(-0.59)

Institutional ownership

0.012
(0.014)
(0.89)

Inside ownership

-0.012
(0.014)
(-0.84)

CEO/chairman separation

0.046
(0.015)
(3.12)
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TABLE 2.2: MASEM Results for CGID (continued)
Board independence

-0.0083
(0.013)
(-0.63)

Board size

-0.020
(0.017)
(-1.19)

Harmonic mean N (firm-years)
Chi-square (df)
RMSEA
GFI
CFI
NFI
RMR

5560
784.03 (15)
0.096
0.98
0.91
0.90
0.039

RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI = comparative fit
index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean square residual
Standard errors and t values in parentheses
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TABLE 2.3: MASEM Results for IDCG
Model 2

161

CEO tenure

CEO pay

Ownership
concentration

Institutional
ownership

Firm size

-0.017
(0.014)
(-1.27)

0.410
(0.012)
(35.42)

0.032
(0.014)
(2.35)

0.077
(0.013)
(5.69)

Firm age

-0.010
(0.013)
(-0.75)

0.160
(0.011)
(13.48)

-0.003
(0.013)
(-0.24)

0.049
(0.013)
(3.71)

Debt-to-equity ratio

-0.059
(0.013)
(-4.44)

0.120
(0.011)
(10.62)

0.007
(0.013)
(0.54)

0.039
(0.013)
(2.97)

Product diversification

-0.019
(0.013)
(-1.39)

-0.041
(0.012)
(-3.60)

-0.019
(0.013)
(-1.41)

0.069
(0.013)
(5.21)

R&D intensity

0.017
(0.014)
(1.24)

0.036
(0.012)
(3.07)

-0.005
(0.014)
(-0.33)

-0.004
(0.013)
(-0.27)

Performance

0.049
(0.013)
(3.64)

0.140
(0.011)
(11.96)

0.004
(0.013)
(0.32)

0.020
(0.013)
(1.54)

International diversification

0.024
(0.014)
(1.73)

0.036
(0.012)
(3.03)

-0.008
(0.014)
(-0.58)

-0.003
(0.013)
(-0.25)

TABLE 2.3: MASEM Results for IDCG (continued)
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Inside
ownership

Model 2
CEO/chairman
separation

Board
independence

Board size

Firm size

-0.072
(0.013)
(-5.36)

0.022
(0.013)
(1.61)

0.059
(0.014)
(4.39)

0.300
(0.013)
(23.54)

Firm age

-0.049
(0.013)
(-3.69)

0.098
(0.013)
(7.38)

-0.037
(0.013)
(-2.80)

0.047
(0.012)
(3.80)

Debt-to-equity ratio

-0.043
(0.013)
(-3.25)

-0.018
(0.013)
(-1.36)

0.021
(0.013)
(1.60)

-0.010
(0.012)
(-0.76)

Product diversification

-0.029
(0.013)
(-2.15)

-0.057
(0.013)
(-4.26)

0.062
(0.013)
(4.63)

0.150
(0.012)
(12.11)

R&D intensity

-0.059
(0.013)
(-4.36)

0.036
(0.013)
(2.66)

0.026
(0.014)
(1.91)

-0.007
(0.013)
(-0.59)

Performance

0.017
(0.013)
(1.24)

0.049
(0.013)
(3.65)

0.019
(0.013)
(1.42)

0.068
(0.012)
(5.47)

International diversification

-0.005
(0.013)
(-0.36)

0.016
(0.014)
(1.19)

-0.007
(0.014)
(-0.50)

0.013
(0.013)
(1.02)

TABLE 2.3: MASEM Results for IDCG (continued)
Harmonic mean N (firm-years)
Chi-square (df)
RMSEA
GFI
CFI
NFI
RMR

5560
4222.66 (43)
0.132
0.91
0.39
0.39
0.076

RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean square
residual
Standard errors and t values in parentheses
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TABLE 2.4: MASEM Results for CGID – Depth vs Breadth of
International Diversification
Model 3
Depth of
international diversification

Breadth of
international diversification

CEO tenure

0.042
(0.014)
(3.03)

0.034
(0.013)
(2.59)

CEO pay

0.045
(0.019)
(2.34)

0.32
(0.018)
(17.35)

Ownership concentration

-0.019
(0.013)
(-1.44)

0.028
(0.012)
(2.28)

Institutional ownership

-0.0033
(0.013)
(-0.24)

0.09
(0.013)
(7.08)

Inside ownership

0.0036
(0.014)
(0.27)

-0.066
(0.013)
(-5.20)

CEO/chairman separation

0.040
(0.015)
(2.74)

0.094
(0.014)
(6.89)

Board independence

0.0043
(0.013)
(0.33)

-0.085
(0.012)
(-6.96)

Board size

0.017
(0.017)
(1.01)

-0.22
(0.016)
(-14.29)

Harmonic mean N (firm-years)
Chi-square (df)
RMSEA
GFI
CFI
NFI
RMR

5859
1140.66 (16)
0.110
0.98
0.89
0.89
0.042

RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI =
comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean square residual
Results for the control variables are not reported (available upon request)
Standard errors and t values in parentheses
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TABLE 2.5: MASEM Results for IDCG – Depth vs Breadth of International Diversification

Depth of
international diversification

Breadth of
international diversification
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Harmonic mean N (firm-years)
Chi-square (df)
RMSEA
GFI
CFI
NFI
RMR

Model 4
Institutional
ownership

Inside
ownership

CEO/chairman
separation

Board
independence

Board size

CEO tenure

CEO pay

Ownership
concentration

0.027
(0.014)
(1.94)

0.0068
(0.012)
(0.58)

-0.022
(0.014)
(-1.61)

-0.016
(0.014)
(-1.21)

0.013
(0.014)
(0.96)

0.017
(0.014)
(1.25)

0.023
(0.014)
(1.72)

0.047
(0.013)
(3.71)

0.0035
(0.014)
(0.25)

0.11
(0.012)
(8.98)

0.022
(0.014)
(1.56)

0.028
(0.014)
(1.99)

-0.036
(0.014)
(-2.60)

-0.00056
(0.014)
(-0.04)

-0.085
(0.014)
(-6.05)

-0.077
(0.013)
(-5.91)

5859
4566.22 (43)
0.134
0.91
0.45
0.45
0.072

RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean
square residual
Results for the control variables are not reported (available upon request)
Standard errors and t values in parentheses

TABLE 2.6: MASEM Results for CGID – High vs Low
Legal Shareholder Protection
Model 5
High
legal shareholder protection

Model 6
Low
legal shareholder protection

International diversification

International diversification

Ownership concentration

-0.033
(0.006)
(-5.46)

0.034
(0.0089)
(3.78)

Institutional ownership

0.00093
(0.0061)
(0.15)

0.0055
(0.0089)
(0.62)

Inside ownership

-0.011
(0.006)
(-1.75)

-0.0055
(0.0091)
(-0.60)

27562
749.09 (3)
0.095
0.99
0.83
0.83
0.026

12546
219.58 (3)
0.076
1.00
0.93
0.93
0.022

Harmonic mean N (firm-years)
Chi-square (df)
RMSEA
GFI
CFI
NFI
RMR

RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI =
comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean square residual
Results for the control variables are not reported (available upon request)
Standard errors and t values in parentheses
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TABLE 2.7: MASEM Results for IDCG – High vs Low
Legal Shareholder Protection
(a) High legal shareholder protection
Ownership
concentration
International diversification

Harmonic mean N (firm-years)
Chi-square (df)
RMSEA
GFI
CFI
NFI
RMR

-0.033
(0.0061)
(-5.41)

Model 7
Institutional
ownership
-0.00016
(0.0060)
(-0.027)

Inside
ownership
-0.0096
(0.0061)
(-1.59)

27562
1208.23 (6)
0.085
0.99
0.73
0.73
0.033

(b) Low legal shareholder protection
Ownership
concentration
International diversification

Harmonic mean N (firm-years)
Chi-square (df)
RMSEA
GFI
CFI
NFI
RMR

0.034
(0.0091)
(3.67)

Model 8
Institutional
ownership
0.001
(0.0091)
(0.11)

Inside
ownership
-0.00078
(0.0088)
(-0.089)

12546
819.54 (6)
0.104
0.98
0.75
0.75
0.041

RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI =
comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean square residual
Results for the control variables are not reported (available upon request)
Standard errors and t values in parentheses
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TABLE 2.8: MASEM Results for CGID – High vs Low
Uncertainty Avoidance
Model 9
High
uncertainty avoidance

Model 10
Low
uncertainty avoidance

International diversification

International diversification

Ownership concentration

-0.010
0.014
-0.69

0.028
0.0047
5.93

Institutional ownership

-0.13
0.015
-8.84

0.046
0.0047
9.64

Inside ownership

-0.047
0.015
-3.20

0.010
0.0047
2.18

4787
282.27 (3)
0.139
0.99
0.81
0.81
0.040

44340
755.15 (3)
0.075
1.00
0.90
0.90
0.021

Harmonic mean N (firm-years)
Chi-square (df)
RMSEA
GFI
CFI
NFI
RMR

RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI =
comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean square residual
Results for the control variables are not reported (available upon request)
Standard errors and t values in parentheses
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FIGURE 2.1: Model Linking Corporate Governance to the Degree of International Diversification
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FIGURE 2.2: Model Linking the Degree of International Diversification to Corporate Governance
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FIGURE 2.3: Effects of Corporate Governance on the Degree of International Diversification
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FIGURE 2.4: Effects of the Degree of International Diversification on Corporate Governance

CONCLUSION
The dissertation extended extant literature on determinants and consequences of
international diversification. In Essay I, we focused on the relationship between
international diversification and firm performance. Our meta-analysis (the largest on this
topic to date) shows that international diversification has an overall positive, but small,
effect on firm performance, albeit with substantial variation in the effect size distribution
depending on firms’ countries of origin. Firms in some countries experience significant
negative performance effects from their internationalization efforts (e.g., in Mexico),
while in others internationalization generates significant positive effects, which range
from very small (e.g., in South Korea) to sizable (e.g., in Greece), or no effects (e.g., in
the Netherlands and Spain). Further, we find that specific home-country institutions have
different effects on the ID-P relationship. In particular, our results show that homecountry quality of business regulations, political risk, generalized trust, long-term
orientation and uncertainty avoidance are all moderators of the ID-P relationship.
This research makes three main contributions to the global strategy literature.
First, we show that, in the aggregate, the positive linear association between
internationalization and performance is modest, and should be considered only as a
“stylized fact”. We also show that this relationship is contingent on home country
institutional conditions, which can significantly affect the magnitude and sign of this
relationship. Taken together, these results indicate that studies of the ID-P relationship
should account for country-of-origin effect; if not, they are likely to be underspecified
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both theoretically and empirically. Relatedly, our findings show the relevance of the
institution-based view of strategy for studying the ID-P relationship. In particular, they
suggest that home country institutions influence firms’ transaction costs and their
managers’ cognitive processes, which, in turn, affect their ability to acquire and deploy
strategic resources, and, ultimately, their potential to succeed in markets at home and
abroad. To date, research has largely overlooked the importance of the institution-based
view for contextualizing the ID-P relationship. Second, we show that multiple formal and
informal institutions across many countries, over a long period of time, affect firms’
ability to benefit from internationalization, contributing to research on institutional
complexity. In doing so, our study provides a richer assessment of how firms’
institutional embeddedness in their home country affects their effectiveness in
international markets. Our third contribution is methodological and pertains to our metaanalytical tests’ use of both Pearson product-moment correlation and partial correlation as
effect sizes, which represents a significant improvement from existing meta-analyses that
only used Pearson product-moment correlations. Incorporating partial correlations allows
us to generate conclusive findings on several important matters that could not be properly
addressed by previous meta-analyses, including the sign and shape of the I-P relationship.
In Essay II, we focused on the relationship between corporate governance and
international diversification. Our MASEM study contributes to the global strategy and
corporate governance literatures through five key findings. The first key finding of our
MASEM study is that, as the agency theory, resource, and information-processing
perspectives suggest, bidirectional causal linkages exist between corporate governance
and international diversification. This important finding constructively addresses the
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potential scientific apophenia (i.e., the tendency to find evidence of order where none
exists) in the CG-ID research area. It also shows the multifaceted interdependence
between corporate governance and international diversification. Furthermore, it provides
additional evidence in support of the complementarity and substitutability between
corporate governance mechanisms at the firm level. The second key finding of our
MASEM study is that the nature of the causal linkages in the CG-ID relationship depends
on the dimension of international diversification. While the international management
literature has clearly pointed out that international diversification is a multidimensional
construct, extant research says little about whether and how depth and breadth differently
affect and/or are differently affected by corporate governance. Our findings improve our
understanding of this relevant theoretical aspect by showing that the positive effect of and
on the breadth of international diversification tends to be greater. The third key finding of
our MASEM study is that the CG-ID relationship is moderated by institutional and
cultural conditions in the home country and, in particular, by the legal protection of
minority shareholders and the national uncertainty avoidance. Previous research says
little about potential factors affecting the CG-ID relationship. Our study, therefore, sheds
some preliminary light on this additional aspect of the complex causal interdependence
between corporate governance and international diversification. The fourth key finding of
our MASEM study is that corporate governance explains the variation of international
diversification better than international diversification explains the variation of corporate
governance. The fifth key finding of our MASEM study is that the magnitude and sign of
the CG-ID relationship in the MASEM results are, in some cases, different from those in
the HOMA results. This confirms the importance, when conducting meta-analytic
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studies, of going beyond traditional techniques, in order to take into account the
interdependencies between all the independent variables as well as the effect of control
variables.
Although consisting of two meta-analyses, one of the main objectives of the
present dissertation was to push forward the extant literature in three main ways: first, by
explaining the mechanisms connecting the main constructs in our theoretical models;
second, by assessing the role of the different dimensions of international diversification;
third, by exploring the role of context (and, thus, advancing a theory in context) in the
ID-P and CG-ID relationships. Indeed, meta-analysis has recently emerged in the
management field not only as a data synthesis technique, but also as a methodological
tool for theory advancement. Still, we believe that the dissertation essays could be
expanded with further research using different data and methodologies. For example, our
meta-analysis on the ID-P relationship could be complemented by case studies and other
types of qualitative research investigating less explored factors at different levels of
analysis that may shape firms’ ability to benefit from their internationalization efforts,
including the role of managerial cognition and various process outcomes associated with
internationalization. Our meta-analysis on the CG-ID relationship could be
complemented, for example, by research that assesses, by using secondary data, the
bidirectional causal effects between the two constructs while accounting for potential
endogeneity in the relationship.
From a more general perspective, this dissertation could be expanded by further
research exploring the connections between international diversification and formal and
informal institutions (and, thus, advancing a theory of context). A key finding of this
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dissertation is that the home-country institutional context moderates the relationships
between international diversification and its determinants and consequences. However,
the formal and informal institutions of the home as well as the host country may play not
just a moderating role in the causal chain. Indeed, the various institutional contexts
confronting firms doing business internationally may directly influence and/or be
influenced by firms’ decision to expand and invest abroad.
Finally, we believe that this dissertation provides at least two valuable insights to
the practice of international business. First, in current global business landscapes
characterized by ongoing debates on corporate governance practices, we show the
importance of executives’ risk preferences and corporate governance mechanisms in
foreign expansion decisions. Second, we point out the role that home-country
institutional contexts play in determining, on the one hand, the performance implications
of international diversification and, on the other hand, the impact of firms’ corporate
governance frameworks on their expansion abroad.
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